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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the history, development, theory, and practice of distributed denial
of service actions as a tactic of political activism. DDOS actions have been used in
online political activism since the early 1990s, though the tactic has recently attracted
significant public attention with the actions of Anonymous and Operation Payback in
December 2010. Guiding this work is the overarching question of how civil
disobedience and disruptive activism can be practiced in the current online space. The
internet acts as a vital arena of communication, self expression, and interpersonal
organizing. When there is a message to convey, words to get out, people to organize,
many will turn to the internet as the zone of that activity. Online, people sign petitions,
investigate stories and rumors, amplify links and videos, donate money, and show their
support for causes in a variety of ways. But as familiar and widely accepted activist
tools-petitions, fundraisers, mass letter-writing, call-in campaigns and others-find
equivalent practices in the online space, is there also room for the tactics of disruption
and civil disobedience that are equally familiar from the realm of street marches,
occupations, and sit-ins? This thesis grounds activist DDOS historically, focusing on
early deployments of the tactic as well as modern instances to trace its development
over time, both in theory and in practice. Through that examination, as well as tool
design and development, participant identity, and state and corporate responses, this
thesis presents an account of the development and current state of activist DDOS
actions. It ends by presenting an analytical framework for the analysis of activist DDOS
actions.
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Working Back from Wikileaks
On November 28, 2010, Wikileaks, along with the New York Times, Der Spiegel,
El Pais, Le Monde, and The Guardian began releasing documents from a leaked cache
of 251, 287 unclassified and classified US diplomatic cables, copied from the closed
Department of Defense network SIPRnet (Borger and Leigh, 2010). In the days that
followed, different organizations and corporations began distancing themselves from
Wikileaks. Amazon WebServices declined to continue hosting Wikileaks's website, and
on the first of December removed its content from its servers (Pelofsky, 2010). The next
day, the public could no longer reach the Wikileaks website at wikileaks.org; Wikileaks'
DNS' provider, EveryDNS, had dropped the site from its entries on the second of
December, temporarily making the site inaccessible through its URL (Associated Press,
2010). Shortly thereafter, what would be known as the "Banking Blockade" began, with
PayPal, PostFinance, MasterCard, Visa, and Bank of America refusing to process
online donations to Wikileaks, essentially halting the flow of monetary donations to the
organization (Hope, 2010).
Wikilieak's troubles attracted the attention of Anonymous, a loose group of
internet denizens, and in particular a smaller subgroup known as AnonOps, who had
1 DNS, or Domain Name System, is a hierarchical distributed naming system used to
identify and locate computers connected to the Internet or any networked system. One
of its primary functions is to translate human-friendly URLs (like www.wikileaks.org) into
numerical IP addresses (like 108.162.233.13). Without a DNS provider, such
translations would not occur, and a website would only be accessibly via the numerical
IP address.
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been engaged in a retaliatory distributed denial of service (or DDOS) campaign called
Operation Payback, targeting the Motion Picture Association of America and other pro-
copyright, anti-piracy groups since September 2010 (Anderson, 2010). A DDOS action
is, simply, when a large number of computers attempt to access one website over and
over again in a short amount of time, in the hopes of overwhelming the server, rendering
it incapable of responding to legitimate requests. Anons, as members of the
Anonymous subculture are known, were happy to extend Operation Payback's range of
targets to include the forces arrayed against Wikileaks and its public face, Julian
Assange. On December 6, they launched their first DDOS action against the website of
the Swiss banking service, PostFinance. Over the course of the next four days,
Anonymous and AnonOps would launch DDOS attacks against the websites of the
Swedish Prosecution Authority, EveryDNS, Senator Joseph Lieberman, MasterCard,
two Swedish politicians, Visa, PayPal, and Amazon.com, and others, forcing many of
the sites to experience at least some amount of downtime (Correll, 2010).
For many in the media and public at large, Anonymous's December 2010 DDOS
campaign was their first exposure to the use of this tactic by activists, and the exact
nature of the action was unclear. Was it an activist action, a legitimate act of protest, an
act of terrorism, or a criminal act? These DDOS actions-concerted efforts by many
individuals to bring down websites by making repeated requests of the websites' servers
in a short amount of time-were covered extensively by the media. In the eyes of the
media and public, Operation Payback opened the door to the potential for civil
disobedience and disruptive activism on the internet. But Operation Payback was far
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from the first use of DDOS as a tool of activism. Rather, DDOS actions have been in
use for over two decades, in support of activist campaigns ranging from pro-Zapatistas
actions to protests against German immigration policy and trademark enforcement
disputes.
The aim of this work is to place DDOS actions, including Operation Payback, in a
historical and theoretical context, covering the use of the tactic, its development over
time, and its potential for ethical practice. Guiding this work is the overarching question
of how civil disobedience and disruptive activism can be practiced in the current online
space. The internet acts as a vital arena of communication, self expression, and
interpersonal organizing. When there is a message to convey, words to get out, people
to organize, many will turn to the internet as the zone of that activity. Online, people
sign petitions, investigate stories and rumors, amplify links and videos, donate money,
and show their support for causes in a variety of ways. But as familiar and widely
accepted activist tools- petitions, fundraisers, mass letter-writing, call-in campaigns and
others-find equivalent practices in the online space, is there also room for the tactics of
disruption and civil disobedience that are equally familiar from the realm of street
marches, occupations, and sit-ins?
The overwhelmingly privatized nature of the internet is a challenge to the practice
of activism online, on the levels of large scale, peaceable assembly, free of expression,
and civil disobedience. Early practitioners of distributed denial of service actions
recognized this, and staged their actions, in part, with the goal of legitimating through
practice civil disobedience online. However, their actions did not stop continued,
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successful efforts by corporate, state, and regulatory powers to render the internet a
privately controlled space, similar to the "privately-controlled public spaces" that pepper
our physical world cities today, such as Zucotti Park, the home of the original Occupy
Wall Street encampment.2 This forces disruptive activism into conflict with the rights of
private property holders, the rights and philosophies of free speech fighting with deeply
engrained property rights of individuals and companies. In the physical world, activists
can take their actions to the street, a culturally respected, and legally protected, avenue
for the outpouring of civic sentiment of all kinds, be it the 1963 March on Washington or
the Nationalist Socialist Party of America on the streets of Skokie. There is no "street"
on the internet.
Because of this rampant privatization and other reasons to be explored in this
work, the theoretical and practical challenges faced by those seeking to engage in
collective action, civil disobedience or disruptive activism online are different from those
faced by activists organizing similarly motivated actions in the physical world. However,
the two domains are often treated as though they were the same. Infringement on the
property rights of private actors is often brought up as a criticism of DDOS actions, as if
there was a space online that wasn't controlled by one private entity or another.
Charges of censorship are usually thrown into the mix as well, because (ironically) of
the internet's overwhelming use as an outlet for speech, by individuals, corporations,
states, and everyone else. "Why," the critique goes, "can't you come up with a way to
2 Foderaro, L. (2011, October 13) Privately Owned Park, Open to the Public, May Make
Its Own Rules. New York Times
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protest that doesn't step on somebody else's toes?" But the internet, as it were, is all
somebody else's toes.
Collectively, we have allowed the construction of an entire public sphere, the
internet, which by accidental design, has none of the inherent free speech guarantees
we have come to expect. Dissenting voices are pushed out of the paths of potential
audiences, effectively removing them from the public discourse. There is nowhere
online for an activist to stand with her friends and her sign. She might set up a
dedicated blog-which may or may not ever be read- but it is much harder for her to
stand collectively with others against a corporate giant in the online space. Because of
the densely intertwined nature of property and speech in the online space, unwelcome
acts of collective protest become also acts of trespass.
While disruptive activism like distributed denial of service actions are condemned
for being an unreasonable violation of others' rights, they are also derided as being too
easy. This "slacktivism" critique posits that most tools of digital activism, from disruptive
tactics like distributed denial of service actions to changing your Twitter or Facebook
profile picture to proclaim your support of a cause, are lazy, simplistic modes of
engagement which have little real effect on activist causes, and as such have no value.
As Malcolm Gladwell articulates it in his critique of "slacktivism," which he refers to as
internet based, "weak-ties" activism:
In other words, Facebook activism succeeds not by motivating
people to make a real sacrifice but by motivating them to do the
things that people do when they are not motivated enough to
make a real sacrifice. We are a long way from the lunch
counters of Greensboro [North Carolina, 1960].
(Gladwell, 2010)
13
Oxblood Ruffin, one of the founding members of the influential hacktivist organization
Cult of the Dead Cow, made a similar critique of Anonymous's use of DDOS:
I've heard DDoSing referred to as the digital equivalent of a
lunch counter sit-in, and quite frankly I find that offensive. It's
like a cat burglar comparing himself to Rosa Parks. Implicit in
the notion of civil disobedience is a willful violation of the law;
deliberate arrest; and having one's day in court. There is none
of that in DDoSing. By comparison to the heroes of the civil
rights movement DDoSing tactics are craven.
(Ruffin, 2013)
These critiques makes a series of assumptions about the purpose and practice of
activism and often ground themselves historically in the Civil Rights Movement and anti-
Vietnam War protests. In this model, worthwhile activism is performed on the streets,
where the activist puts himself in physical and legal peril to support his ideals. Activism
is "hard," not just anyone can do it. Activism has a strong, discernible effect on its
target. If the activist is not placing herself in physical danger to express her views, then
it is not valid activism.
The "slacktivism" critique achieves its rhetorical purpose by holding a developing,
theoretically-juvenile body of activist practices in comparison with the exceptional
activist movements of the past. But, it fails to consider that activism can have many
divergent goals beyond direct influence on power structures. It explicitly denies that
impact on individuals and personal performative identification with communities of
interest can be valid activist outcomes. It demands a theoretical and practical maturity
from a sphere of activism (that is, online activism) that has not been around long
enough to either adapt existing theory and practice to the online environment or
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generate its own. It casts as a failure the fact that the simpler modes of digitally-based
activism allow more people to engage. As the cost of entry-level engagement goes
down, more people will engage. Some of those people will continue to stay involved with
activist causes and will continue to scale the ladder of engagement to more advanced
and involved forms of activism. Others won't. But there must be a bottom rung to step
on, and so-called "slacktivism" can serve as that in the online activist space.
Activist DDOS actions are easy to criminalize in the eye of the public. In fact, the
overwhelming majority of DDOS actions reported in the news media are criminal
actions. DDOS is a popular tactic of extortion, harassment, and silencing. Here is
another challenge faced by practitioners of activist DDOS actions not faced by
individuals participating in other types of disruptive actions: a sit-in is perceived as
activist in nature, a DDOS action is perceived as criminal. Sit-ins are overwhelmingly
used in activist situations. DDOS is deployed as a tactic of criminality much more than it
is as a tactic of activism. This means that each use of DDOS as an activist tactic must
first prove that it is not criminal before it can be accepted as activism. This raises
vexing questions about the use of multi-purpose tactics in activism when they are also
effective criminal tactics. Is it possible for DDOS to be taken seriously as a tool of
activism when it must first overcome such a strong association with criminality?
These negative associations and assumptions are further entrenched by the
terminology commonly used to refer to DDOS actions of all stripes: DDOS attacks. By
referring to all DDOS actions, regardless of motivation as "attacks," the public, law
enforcement, even practitioners, are primed to think of DDOS actions in terms of
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violence, malice, and damage. In order to conduct and present this analysis without this
bias towards an interpretation of violence and harm, I do not use the term "DDOS
attacks" throughout this thesis, but rather refer to all uses of DDOS as "DDOS actions."
Today's distributed denial of service actions are part of a history of denial of
service actions. Actions like strikes, work slowdowns, blockades, occupations, and sit-
ins all serve as ideological and theoretical antecedents to the digitally-based distributed
denial of service action. Activist DDOS actions have undergone basic shifts in practice,
purpose, and philosophy over the past two decades. Beginning as an exercise by
experienced activists looking to stake out the internet as a new zone of activism, it is
now mainly practiced by transgressive, technologically-mediated subcultures, often
focused on internet-centered issues, who consider the online space to be a primary
zone of socialization, communication, and activism. This has had implications for the
basic sets of motives behind actions, the technological affordances present in the tools
used, and the specific contexts of the tactics' deployment.
The structure of this work
This thesis will situate distributed denial of service actions within the spheres of
both online and offline activism, addressing its development over the past two decades,
and the particular aspects and challenges that separate it from similar types of
disruptive activism in the physical world. Through this analysis of distributed denial of
service actions, I address the broader issue of civil disobedience and the practice of
disruptive activism in the online space. The internet is a vital outlet for innovative
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political speech, and civil disobedience is a valuable and well-respected tool of activism.
This work attempts to put forward an analysis that will aide in the practice of civil
disobedience on the internet, its perception as a valid form of contemporary political
activism, and the online space as an appropriate zone for disruptive political speech and
action.
I'll begin with two brief notes, which will explain some of the technical and legal
aspects of distributed denial of service actions, as well as a timeline, which gives some
brief background on the different DDOS actions examined in this work.
Chapter One looks at the different theories and models of practice that can
motivate the use of DDOS as an activist tactic. These different models of practice each
encompass a set of goals and rationale that in turn adapt the use of the tactic to a
particular context. This chapter examines direct action, media manipulation, and
biographical impact as models of practice that can animate a DDOS action. The
chapter also considers several critical models: DDOS as censorship, DDOS as
ineffective activism, and DDOS's unclear criteria for success.
Chapter Two examines the role of tool design and development in activist DDOS
actions. For DDOS actions, the tool used is often serves a central, unifying function. It
represents a shared jumping off point for the action. The design and affordances of the
tool used can define a variety of aspects of the actions, including the level of
engagement expected from participants, as well as indicating, after the fact, the types of
individuals who were recruited and active, and the amount of political "seriousness"l
indicated by the action. This chapter looks at the design and development of the
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Electronic Disturbance Theater's FloodNet tool, and two versions of Anonymous's Low
Orbit Ion Cannon tool, paying particular attention to the changing functionality and
interfaces of the tools.
Chapter Three examines several aspects of participant identity within the context
of a DDOS action. A variety of identity constructions, revelations, and concealments
come into play with DDOS actions. The anonymity that can be part of a DDOS action
has become a particularly contentious issue among critics of DDOS actions, and is
examined in this chapter. The construction of collective, performative identities within
activist groups, especially with Anonymous is also examined, along with issues of
gender, race, and class as played out in a technologically defined activist space. Finally
this chapter explores how the concept of unsympathetic actors and "impure dissent," as
defined by Tommie Shelby, applies to modern DDOS actions.
Chapter Four looks at state and corporate responses to activist DDOS actions.
These reactions typically deny or belittle the activist nature of these actions, instead
defining them as criminal or acts of terrorism or cyberwar. This strategy further
diminishes attempts to keep the internet available as a public space, as it elevates the
interests of security and stability over First Amendment issues. This chapter looks at
how those interests are played out in the legal reactions to DDOS actions, the
consignment of DDOS actions to the realm of terrorism and cyberwar, and in the
structure of corporate internet presences and reactions to online protest.
Chapter Five provides an analytical ethical framework for the analysis of activism
DDOS actions. The framework considers the use of the tactic within broader campaigns;
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activists' motivations for using the tactic; the intended and actual effects achieved; the
technological capacities used; power relations between organizers, participants and
targets; and the role of state, state-related, and semi-state actors. Taken together, these
factors create a holistic, qualitative system for evaluating the ethical validity of a given
DDOS action, and can be used to create models to guide the use of the tactic, and
similarly disruptive tools of digital activism in the future.
Technical Note
At its most basic level, a denial-of-service action seeks to render a server
unusable to anyone looking to communicate with it for legitimate purposes. When this
action comes from one source, it is called a denial-of-service, or DOS, action. When it
comes from multiple sources, it is called a distributed denial-of-service, or DDOS,
action. Complex or sophisticated tools are not necessary to launch a DDOS action. A
group of people reloading the same website again and again at the same time could
constitute a manual DDOS action if they intend to bring that site down. However,
automated tools and methods are much more effective against websites that rely on
today's web infrastructure.
One such automated method is to flood the target machine with "pings" from
active machines. A ping is a request for availability, one computer asking another, "Are
you there?" However, when employed as part of a DDOS action, the humble ping is
transformed into a "ping flood," wherein thousands of ping requests a second can be
transmitted to the target server. These requests quickly overwhelm the server's limited
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resources, and the server is unable to effectively respond to legitimate traffic requests.
This is one of the goals of the action: "downtime" on the targeted server.
A DDOS action can exploit different processes to achieve its goal, monopolizing
the lines that connect the server to the outside world or taxing the target's processing
and memory resources (Eddy, 2007). A mail bomb drops an enormous amount of e-mail
messages onto a server, crashing it under the load. Making repeated process intensive
requests, such as searches, can also cripple a website (Zuckerman, Roberts, McGrady,
York, & Palfrey, 2010).
As mentioned above, a few dozen people clicking "Refresh" at the same site at
the same time could constitute a DDOS action. Other, far less labor-intensive ways of
waging such an action exist. One method is to employ a "botnet," a collection of
computers acting under the control of a central machine. Often these machines are
innocents, having been illicitly infected with a program that renders them susceptible to
the commands of the central machine (Zuckerman et al., 2010). Sometimes these are
voluntary botnets, where users have volunteered their computing power by downloading
and running a program. It is important to distinguish among actions carried out with
botnets comprising compromised machines, voluntary botnets, and individuals operating
autonomous machines. The use of nonvolunteer botnets has a significant affect on the
ethical and political validity of an activist DDOS action. This will be examined in detail in
a later section.
To defend against a DDOS action is difficult and expensive. One can attempt to
block the individual IP addresses the noxious traffic appears to hail from, but it is
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possible for a participant to spoof an endless series of IP addresses, turning simple
blocking into an endless game of Whack-A-Mole. If the action is distributed across a
sufficiently large number of machines, the number of packets sent by each machine
need not be particularly large, making it difficult to tell legitimate traffic from illegitimate.
One could acquire the servers and processing power necessary to absorb the additional
traffic until it abates. This avenue is generally available only to large corporations able to
handle its high costs. As a result, smaller sites can sometimes be driven offline
completely by a DDOS action of relatively short duration, not through the direct process
of the DDOS itself but through the reactions of support services, like ISPs (Zuckerman
et al., 2010).
Legal Note
DDOS actions are considered illegal in most jurisdictions. In the United States of
America, DDOS actions are prosecuted under Title 18, Section 1030 (a)(5) of the U.S.
Code. The crime described by the statute is the "intentional ... damage" of "protected
3 This section, known colloquially as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (1984), forbids
any action that
"(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command,
and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a
protected computer;
(B) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of
such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or
(C) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of
such conduct, causes damage and loss."
A "protected computer" is defined in Title 18, Section 1030 (e)(2) as
"a computer-(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United
States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by
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computers," broadly defined as computers used, in whole or in part, by financial
institutions or the U.S. government. However, as will be discussed later, confusion
persists about the legal status of activist DDOS actions, something that presents serious
challenges to the organizers of these actions.
There are many confluences of computational circumstances that appear
identical in form to a DOS or DDOS action but that are not DDOS actions. For example,
a website operator may use an automated "stress-testing" tool to generate an
exceptional amount of traffic directed at a particular server to see how the machine
reacts, essentially launching a DOS action against his or her own machine for research
purposes. There is no difference between the basic functionality of a stress-testing tool
and an automated DDOS tool, and most automated DDOS tools are usually distributed
as stress-testing tools. 4 Another example of a "DDOS that is not a DDOS" would be the
crash that sometimes occurs when a popular blog links to a site whose server buckles
under the unexpected crush of attention. The linker did not direct his or her followers to
click the link with the intention of crashing the site, as with a manual DDOS, but the
or for a financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct
constituting the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the
Government; or (B) which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication,
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States."
4 As noted by havonsmacker (2010) at the "loiq" distributed denial-of-service (DDOS)
tool download page:
"LOIQ stands for LOIC [Low Orbit Ion Cannon] in Qt4. It is an attempt to re-create the
LOIC server stress-test tool using Qt4/C++ instead of original C#/.Net to make it
available under *NIX OSes (primarily under Linux). It is released under the terms of
GNU GPL 3 or later."
It is worth noting that this "a-wink-and-a-nod" method of distribution has a physical-world
analog in the sale of glass pipes "for use with tobacco only." This is seldom their
ultimate use case. Thanks to Ethan Zuckerman for pointing out this parallel.
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effect is the same. This makes the stipulations that crimes under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (1984) be "intentional" an important one.
Similarly, identical actions that intend to knock a site offline could be undertaken
for significantly different motivations. A DDOS action may be launched against a site in
an attempt to force it to remove a specific piece of content or in an effort to drive a
vulnerable site offline entirely, by making it impossible for an ISP to host the content.
Online publications and small ISPs are particularly vulnerable to this type of action. An
example of this occurred in 1997, when a large, popularly supported DDOS campaign
was launched against the ISP Institute for Global Communications (IGC, 1997) in an
effort to force it to stop hosting a Basque web publication, Euskal Herria Journal (Nicol,
n.d.). The IGC's servers were knocked offline, rendering inaccessible the websites and
e-mail of more than 13,000 subscribers. Although the IGC did eventually remove the
Euskal Herria Journafs content from its servers, it replaced it with a statement decrying
what it saw as vigilante censorship on the Internet and was supported in its arguments
by groups such as NetAction, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, and the
Association for Progressive Communications (IGC, 1997). When classifying these types
of actions, it is useful to consider the centrality of an online presence to the target's
mission. To take an ISP or a small blog offline can effectively destroy that organization
or individual's ability to fulfill its professional purpose and communicate with the public.
These cases might be viewed as instances of cybercrime, cyberterrorism, or
censorship, and will be discussed in detail later.
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Alternatively, a DDOS may be launched against a large, well-defended corporate
or government site, one unlikely to fall under the pressures of a DDOS action, for the
purpose of drawing attention to an issue. Such corporate or governmental homepages
rarely serve a vital role in the operations of those organizations. One does not go to
www.starbucks.com to get one's morning latte. Furthermore, such organizations use
established press channels to communicate with the public, not poorly trafficked
homepages that more often than not serve a placeholder or trademark defense
purpose. To briefly tear down the online poster of these organizations (Munroe, 2011)
may serve a symbolic purpose and be a good way to attract attention, but it often has
little effect on their practical, day-to-day operations. Actions aimed against such sites
can be seen as an example of "electronic civil disobedience" or valid online protest
(Auty, 2004; Critical Art Ensemble, 1996). The U.S. statute, however, contains no
provisions acknowledging that such an action could constitute political speech.
The technological simplicity behind a DDOS action has contributed to its
attractiveness as an activist tactic. One does not need advanced technical skills to
construct a simple automated DDOS tool and virtually no skills to participate in a manual
DDOS. A DDOS action also lends itself conceptually to metaphors and comparisons to
physical-world activism. Activists have often called DDOS actions "virtual sit-ins." By
invoking this metaphor, they seek to take advantage of the cultural capital and
symbolism of historical sit-in campaigns (Rolfe, 2005). This comparison is imperfect yet
commonly invoked. The virtual sit-in metaphor is just one of a number of models and
metaphors used by the tactics proponents and critics to conceptualize DDOS within
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existing activist practice. The use of DDOS as a protest tactic has evolved as the
political identity of the Internet has grown more complex. Before the use of this tactic




Theories and Models of Practice
Activist actions, be they street marches, petition drives, or DDOS actions, are
each individually driven by particular theories of change and models of practice.
Theories of change set out hypotheses of how change may be effected within a given
system, while a model of practice is an attempt to codify a given theory of change into
an example that may be followed. An analysis of these theories and models as they
apply to specific actions can illuminate the motivations of the organizers and
participants and their histories and political philosophies, as well as serving as
benchmarks in the evolution of DDOS as an activist tactic itself. Such an analysis can
also provide a space where we can evaluate the expected value of DDOS as an activist
tactic and its perceived shortcomings in concert with case studies; we can set
theoretical expectations against actual events, and thus judge the usefulness of different
theories and models as they are used in activist DDOS actions. Although there are
numerous possibilities, this section will focus on direct action, media manipulation, and
biographical impact, along with historical examples to highlight the interpreted strengths,
weakness, affordances, and controversy points of each of these models. I will follow by
examining several critical models.
DDOS actions are rarely driven by a single theoretical or practical motivation.
Often there are a number of overlapping goals and justifications, added on as the action
is developed in the context of a larger campaign. The examples presented below,
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though used to illustrate definitional norms of activist DDOS practice, should not be
taken to mean that the theories and models described were the only ones present in a
given action. While the examples were chosen because they allow certain details and
questions central to the different models to be brought more clearly to light, they often
contain aspects of other models in practice and a plethora of motivations.
DDOS as direct action
Direct action in activism is an embodiment of an inherently confrontational
philosophy of action. Direct action tactics value direct confrontations with structures of
power, often state or corporate in nature. The tactics aim to both disrupt through action
a prevailing structure viewed by the activists as causing harm, and to, by challenging
that structure, provoke a response which is then allowed to stand on its own as an
illustration of the reality of the challenged institution (Thompson 2010). Drawn from
anarchist and Situationist philosophy, direct action tactics aim to inject direct, actualized
democracy into the activist process (Graeber, 2007). In so much as it relies on the
revelatory spectacle of the provoked response, direct action communicates more to
spectators and participants than to targets, though an exchange with the target is
necessary to provoke the spectacle of response. When the on-the-street tactics involve
physical disruption of property, such as the destruction of corporate property as often
practiced by Black Bloc anarchists, or violent confrontations with law enforcement, this
model is the most vulnerable to accusations of hooliganism and terrorism in the media
and by law enforcement (Thompson, 2010).
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In the case of DDOS actions, those pursuing the direct action model are
motivated by a desire to disrupt a process for the purpose of disrupting that process and
potentially provoking a cascade of responses, on technological, political, media, and
social levels. Direct action DDOS also highlights the importance of "place" within digital
activism, which is here explored through Timothy Zick's concept of "contested place."
The Electrohippies vs the WTO, 1999
In late November, 1999, the World Trade Organization held its Ministerial
Conference in Seattle, Washington. The city streets were filled with protesters opposed
to the WTO's pro-globalization agenda. A number of different activist organizations
were involved, and a variety of tactics were employed, running the gamut from peaceful
permitted street marches, puppets and colorful costumes (including a plethora of
activists dressed up as sea turtles) to the Black Bloc's highly confrontational campaign
of corporate property destruction. After the aggressive reactions of police and city
officials to the activist activities, the events surrounding the WTO Ministerial Conference
become popularly known as the Battle for Seattle. It is seen as an important moment in
the development of the anti-globalization movement.
While the sea turtles were marching in the streets of Seattle, a British
organization called the electrohippies waged a simultaneous online action against the
WTO. From November 30 though December 4, the electrohippies organized and staged
a combination DDOS/e-mail bombing campaign targeting the WTO's main conference
servers, public-facing websites, and various individuals associated with the WTO,
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including PR and operations staff, and various state representatives. The DDOS section
of the action used a Javascript tool, based on the Electronic Disturbance Theater's
Zapatista FloodNet tool, which was developed in 1998 and released to the public in
1999. The limitations of the tool required that participants be connected to the internet
with the tool (available at the electrohippies webpage) downloaded and running for the
duration of their participation. the electrohippies claimed that over the course of the
action, over 450,000 people participated in the action, with the targeted sites
experiencing sporadic downtime and service slowdowns. The extent to which the DDOS
action affected the functioning of the WTO websites and conference network is disputed
(DJNZ, 2000). The goal of the DDOS action, stated in the calls to action the
electrohippies distributed on various mailing lists and on its website, was to hamper the
PR efforts of the conference:
the electrohippies are organising a 'virtual sit-in' of the WTO's
special conference website. It is intended that this website will
be the main conduit for accessing information about the
conference, and the events taking place. By taking action
against the conference server and the main WTO server, we
restrict the PR staff at the WTO from spreading their global
corporate agenda.
(Ehippies@tesco.net,1999) )5
After the DDOS campaign ended on December 4, the electrohippies began a two-day
email bombing campaign, the group directed their supporters to email large,
uncompressed picture and document files (some suggested documents were the Kyoto
5 ehippies@tesco.net (November 29, 1999) WTO Sit-in open! - enter the virtual protest
now! Message posted to diggers350 yahoo group, archived at
groups.yahoo.com/group/Diggers350/message/236
29
Protocol on Climate Change, and several EPA and WHO reports) along with personal
messages, to a list of WTO affiliated addresses. The goal was to overwhelm the internal
email systems of the organization and hamper internal communications.
So far we've demonstrated that the WTO's public information
system is not immune from public pressure. Now we move to
their private information system - their email. What we would
like people to do is email the WTO with personal messages
expressing your own reasons why you object to them and the
Seattle conference. Of course, sending a short types [sic]
message will not be that effective - so you'll also need to attach
a large file to send with it.
(Ehippies@tesco.net,1 999))6
The Battle in Seattle, online and on the ground
As with other early proponents of online-based activism, the electrohippies were
interested in creating models of online activism that were functionally and
philosophically equivalent to physical practices already in existence. They were
particularly interested in establishing the online space as an arena of activism socially,
culturally, and legally equivalent to the physical world. Like the Electronic Disturbance
Theater, the electrohippies drew heavily on the "virtual sit-in" metaphor and used
"popular legitimacy" as a marker of success:
The structure of client-side distributed actions developed by the
electrohippies means that there must be widespread support
across a country or continent in order to make the system work.
Our method has built within it the guarantee of democratic
6 ehippies@tesco.net (December 2,1999) THE WTO SIT-IN: PHASE 2 STARTS NOW!
Message released by the electrohippies, archived at
www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/phasetwo.html
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accountability. If people don't vote with their modems (rather
than voting with their feet) the action would be an abject failure.
-DJNZ, (2000)7
The "client-side" terminology used here differentiated the electrohippies' action from
other types of DDOS actions that did not require the conscious, active commitment of a
large number of participants to be successful. the electrohippies referred to this
approach as "server side" DDOS actions, as opposed to exploit-based and application
layer "server-side" actions, which could amplify the flow of traffic from individual
participants or use means which did not rely on the active presence of thousands of
participants to bring down a site. The electrohippies, and the EDT before them,
purposefully hamstrung the technological tools they used in order to maintain a one to
one participant to signal ratio.
The desire to remain in functional lockstep with existing forms of on-the-street
activism (the refusal to augment activist traffic, the strict reliance on popular participation
for judgments of success) also provides a basis for the use of DDOS as a tool of direct
action. the electrohippies viewed the internet as a public space whose ability to function
as such was being compromised by the overwhelming presence of corporate and
7 "Client-side Distributed Denial-of-Service: Valid campaign tactic or terrorist act?" is
collectively credited to "DJNZ and the action tool development group of the
electrohippies collective" This is further explained:
"the electrohippies collective are a'virtual group' in the sense that their activities are
organised and carried out solely on the Internet they do not meet. They aim of the group
is to extend the philosophy of activism and direct action into the 'virtual' world of
electronic information exchange and communications. Why use the name
'electrohippies'? It's based upon a situationist paradox that seeks to promote a positive
message by exploiting its negative connotations. But it's also a nicely comical label, with
plenty of stereotypical overtones that we can exploit as a means to make our point
about the position of ordinary people within the global 'new world order."' (DJNZ 2000)
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commercial interests. The WTO action was intended to hamper the public and private
operation of the WTO, but was also intended to be a forceful, public-facing statement in
support of the right of the public to use the internet as an activist space. The Supreme
Court articulated a continuum of public fora, adeptly described by McPhail,
Schweingruber, and McCarthy in "Policing Protests in the United States: 1960-1995,"
and by Timothy Zick in Speech Out of Doors. The continuum roughly articulates four
types of public fora, "the 'traditional public forum,' the 'limited' or 'designated' public
forum,' the 'nonpublic forum,' and private property." These distinct fora are differentiated
by the different obligations the state holds towards the practice of free speech within the
fora. The "traditional public forum," made up of public streets, sidewalks, and parks is
the most free of these, wherein the state is forbidden from regulating speech based on
content, and only permitted to regulated the "time, place, and manner" of speech acts
(Zick, 2009). "Private property" is the most restrictive, wherein the owner of the property
has extensive license to regulate speech as it occurs on her property (McPhail, 1998).
the electrohippies'action can be seen as an attempt to re-assert the fundamental reality
of the internet as a "public forum" in the face of its attempted re-designation as "private
property" (McPhail, 1998). This assertion comes, by design, into direct confrontation
with the WTO's attempt to establish and occupy private and ideologically controlled
spaces on the internet, in addition to its function as a force for globalization. This
struggle for the definition of online space mirrored the struggle on the streets of Seattle,
where protesters clashed with police in an attempted assertion of "public space," and
where the anarchistic Black Bloc engaged with physical, spatial representations of
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globalized corporate capitalism in an attempt to forcefully interpolate the "public space"
into the "private space."
The strict physical world parallelism sought by digitally-enabled activists like the
Electronic Disturbance Theater and the electrohippies necessitates a physicalized view
of the internet itself: the internet itself must be seen as a physical place, albeit one with
special attributes. Websites become representative static containers, which maintain an
occupying presence on the network even as their content and functionality is pushed
offline by the force of the DDOS. That presence remains in the non-responsive yet still
labeled and branded blankness of the downed website. Conspicuous in its lack of
expected messaging and voice, this "presence" is still very much an occupying,
informatic structure online. A direct action DDOS seeks to strip away the attractive,
humanized facade to reveal a corporate target's reality as black boxed and monolithic,
fundamentally unresponsive (metaphorically and actually) to human concerns. This has
a transitory equivalence in the goals of street-level direct action, which seeks to lay bare
the true nature of things through unvarnished confrontation with state and corporate
structures of power.
Destruction, in the case of physical world altercations with corporate facades,
and disruption, in the case of DDOS actions, is part of the sought after spectacle: the
responsive-made-unresponsive, the available-made-unavailable. Ensuing media
coverage, statements of corporate spokespeople, and reactions of law enforcement,
including those present at the scene, all add to the spectacle being produced. As the
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public consumes the spectacle of destruction/disruption and response, the hope is that
they will be drawn out of passive consumption and to action.
Direct action DDOS actions also emphasize the value of "place" in online
activism. Some critics of direct action acts of digital activism, like DDOS actions or
website defacements, ask why the activist actions can't be moved offsite, perhaps to a
reserved "activist domain," where they would not be so disruptive. This is similar to the
"demonstration zones" and "free speech zones" often set up around political party
conventions or meetings of international governmental organizations, like the WTO or
the G8. In 2004, a federal judge described one such "demonstration zone" to be used
at the Democratic National Convention in Boston as a "symbolic affront to the First
Amendment" (Zick, 2009). There is critical value in being physically or conceptually
proximate to locations that are symbolic of or central to a specific activist cause.
Timothy Zick calls these "contested places." Contested places serve to "facilitate,
amplify, and convey particular messages" (Zick, 2009, p 105). In addition to adding
symbolic value to an activist action, contested places offer access to specific audiences
who are often connected to the activists' message (Zick, 2009). Sequestering physical
world activists in an isolated "demonstration zone" or digital activists in an perhaps even
more isolated "activist domain" severely hampers activists ability to get their message
out to individuals to whom it would be the most relevant. As will be discussed in
Chapter Five, the open airing, reception, and discussion of dissenting views is a vital
part of democracy. To deny activists access to contested places because of their
potential for disruption hamstrings the public debate. Direct action DDOS aims to
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engage through temporary disruption, a goal which would be impossible if they were not
allowed some access to the contested place of a specific website.
DDOS as media manipulation
A second model for DDOS in activism is as a tool of media manipulation and
popular attention direction. In this instance, the DDOS action is primarily used to focus
attention on an event or issue external to the DDOS itself. The challenge, as is the case
with public, performative activism in the physical world, is getting media outlets to cover
the issues that drive the activism, and not merely the spectacle of the activism itself or
tactics used.
The Electronic Disturbance Theater: no such thing as bad press?
In a campaign that primarily seeks to achieve change through the medium of
popular attention, activists must enter into an, often uneasy, symbiotic relationship with
the mass media industry. News coverage of an action may result in further coverage of
an organization and a cause, which may, in turn, inform a public outcry or directly
influence decision makers to initiate desired change. But, as argued by Todd Gitlin, for
a given protest action to attract sympathetic media attention, it must look like what the
media expects a protest action to look like: "...[protests] become 'newsworthy' only by
submitting to the implicit rules of newsmaking (themselves embedded in history) of what
a 'story' is, what an 'event' is, what a 'protest' is" (Gitlin, 2003). The use of innovative
tactics and settings present a challenge as multiple parties (activists, law enforcement,
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state actors, corporations) seize the opportunity created by novelty to control the
narrative, and define a given action (and subsequent use of the tactic) as legitimate or
illegitimate. If a tactic such as DDOS is defined as illegitimate, the media could fail to
recognize a given action as "activism" and cover only the novelty, spectacle, and
criminality of the tactic being deployed.
The Electronic Disturbance Theater pioneered the use of DDOS actions as a tool
of popular activism, beginning in 1998 with a series of pro-Zapatista actions targeting a
number of sites, using a specially developed tool called FloodNet. The EDT referred to
their actions as "virtual sit-ins," a strategy picked up by subsequent groups like the
electrohippies, relying on the historically-loaded nature of the term to act as a type of
pedagogical short hand as to the legitimacy and certain formal aspects of the DDOS
tactic (Rolfe, 2005). The EDT promoted a conceptualization of DDOS as an auxiliary
political act, embedded within larger campaigns. While a group using DDOS as a tool of
direct action would privilege downtime as a marker of a successful action, this was
relatively unimportant to the EDT. Stefan Wray notes that FloodNet, the DDOS tool
designed and used by the EDT in the 1990s and early 2000s and which will be
examined in detail in a later chapter, rarely resulted in actual downtime for the targeted
sites (Wray, 1998). The EDT saw the media attention paid to its actions as a primary
goal, taking care to distribute press releases to major media outlets and to announce all
actions publicly beforehand (Dominguez, 2009).
The EDT did attract news coverage over its active years, however this coverage
did not always cover the deeper political and social issues the group had hoped to draw
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attention to with their activism. Some articles focused on the spectacle of the the EDT
and their "virtual sit-ins" in digital activism trend pieces, more interested in performing a
roll call of the activist space than interrogating the motivations and logics behind a
specific action. An October 1998 New York Times article, headlined 'Hacktivists' of All
Persuasions Take Their Struggle to the Web," called the EDT's use of DDOS
"... computer hacking, so far largely nuisance attacks and the equivalent of electronic
graffiti..." (Harmon, 1998). Some 14 other individuals and organizations, consistently
referred to as "hackers," are mentioned in the 2,025 word article. Stories in the Ottawa
Citizen8 , Computerworld, and the Sydney Morning Heraldl0 followed a similar pattern.
Other articles grouped the EDT and other activist organizations under the label "cyber-
terrorists"11 or force these activities into a cyberwar framework, using phrases like
"targeted cyber attacks" and "firing the first shots in a cyber war" to describe protest
actions.12
The EDT conceived of their Flood Net-powered DDOS actions in the late 1998
and 1999 as primarily media events, meant to direct popular attention to the Zapatista
struggle. However, as Graham Meikle argues, because much of the coverage was
either reactionary early-cyberwar rhetoric or facilely focused on FloodNet's novelty, it
8 Paquin, B. (1998, October 26) E-Guerillas in the Mist. Ottawa Citizen
9 Radcliff, D. (2000, October 16) Meet the Hacktivist. Computerworld
10 Nguyen, M. (2002, August 17) Armchair Activism. Sydney Morning Herald
1 Regan, T. (1999, July 1) When terrorists turn to the Internet. Christian Science
Monitor
Editorial (1999, November 10) Cyber-terrorism's threat becoming real. Hamilton
Spectator
12 Lasker, J. (2002, May 14) Hackers Use Computer Skills to Promote Politically
Motivated Mischief, Mayhem. Buffalo News
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would be a stretch to consider the FloodNet actions to be successful on that level
(Meikle, 2002). Many of the articles covering the EDT can be seen as attempts on the
part of the news media to categorize the activists and their actions into some sort of
known quantity, terrorists or hackers or artists. The novelty of the DDOS tactic provided
this sorting opportunity, but what was not required was the actual story of the activism
behind the tactic's use.
Toywar allies: third party advocacy and packaged narratives
In December of 1999, the EDT, the Swiss art group etoy, and RTmark launched
"The Twelve Days of Christmas" action using the EDT's FloodNet DDOS tool. Their
target was the retail site eToys.com, which had filed a lawsuit against the etoy group
over the ownership of the URL etoy.com (Wark, 2003). As part of the greater "toywar"
campaign, which involved physical world demonstrations, publicity and letter writing
campaigns, and a multiplayer online game, the "12 Days of Christmas" DDOS campaign
was intended, according to Ricardo Dominguez, to "...represent the presence of a global
group of people gathered to bear witness to a wrong" (Dominguez quoted in Wark,
2003), as well as hamper eToys.com's online operations during the critical Christmas
shopping season. Some 1,700 individuals participated in the DDOS action. In January
2000, eToys.com dropped its suit and paid the court costs of etoy.
The toywar campaign enjoyed significant coverage in the mainstream news
media, mostly due to the ongoing drama of the eToys.com lawsuit. The case was seen
as a test of the lengths corporations could go to police their trademark online, and was
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followed closely by the national business press. As the case played out, inside and
outside the courtroom, multiple stories appeared in Wired, the New York Times, the
Washington Post, the Guardian, USA TODAY, and other international news outlets.
Unlike coverage of the EDT and the electrohippies, the toywar coverage, with few
exceptions, did not focus on the technical machinations of the protest action or attempt
to classify RTmark, etoy, or the EDT as terrorists, criminal hackers, or even
cybersquatters. Rather, news outlets made extensive use of the David and Goliath
narrative of a legal dispute between a large corporate online retailer and a small avant-
garde art group.
Of particular interest here is the emergence of vocal third parties advocating for
etoy. In coverage of the EDT and the electrohippies, any third parties quoted who were
not also digital activists or hacktivists were predominantly information security
professionals or others who condemned the concept of electronic civil disobedience in
general13 . The etoy/toywar coverage, on the other hand, included the voices of John
1 A June, 1999 Christian Science Monitor article, "Newest tool for social protest: the
Internet," quotes a RAND researcher, the director of a social-justice group, and a
University of Texas professor as saying the use of DDOS by the EDT is, "idiotic," "not
constructive," "not good Internet etiquette," "divisive," and that "the kind of actions
espoused by the EDT have been widely shunned by social activists of all stripes." (Van
Slambrouck, 1999)
A second Christian Science Monitor article, published in July 1999, places the
EDT's Zapatista actions exclusively in the company of highly colorful hypotheticals
about the dangers of cyberterrorism, while declining to interview any members of the
EDT. (Regan, 1999)
In 2002, the Buffalo News ran a 1,625 word feature article, "Hackers Use
Computer Skills to Promote Politically Motivated Mischief, Mayhem," which did not
interview any activists, though it did interview multiple academics and computer security
researchers. The EDT and the electrohippies were grouped together indiscriminately
with organizations with significantly different tactics and motivations, such as website
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Perry Barlow and attorneys at the Electronic Frontier Foundation14 and a judge for the
1996 Prix Arts Electronica.
The presence of the solid, easily understandable narrative structure of the court
case allowed the news media to focus on the nuances of the dispute and the
accompanying "12 Days of Christmas" DDOS action. As a result the coverage was
much more sympathetic to both etoy's legal claim and the legitimacy of the DDOS action
and contained a wider range of voices than coverage of other EDT or electrohippies
actions.
Anonymous and the media: a study in manipulation
Anonymous, a loose collection of internet denizens that sprang from the
unmoderated image board 4chan, has, over the past few years, rapidly increased their
capacity to attract and manipulate mainstream media attention (Phillips, 2012). This
ability was on display during the Operation PayBack DDOS campaign in December
2010, sometimes known as Operation Avenge Assange. During this action, the high
defacement, malware, and included theoretical future attacks on infrastructure. All
groups, real and imaginary, were referred to as "hackers" or "hacktivists." (Lasker, 2002)
In 1998, the New York Times called the EDT's 'virtual sit-in' "largely nuisance
attacks and the equivalent of electronic graffiti..." (Harmon, 1998)
14 WIRED's 1999 article, "Be Grateful for Etoy," quotes John Perry Barlow extensively,
as he calls the etoy/eToys fight "the battle of Bull Run," and invokes the ghost of internet
luminary Jon Postel, saying "If Jon Postel were alive, he'd be in tears." The article goes
on to quote Electronic Frontier Foundation legal director Shari Steele as saying "Shame
on eToys for misusing the law in this way," and characterizing the case as a "clear-cut
case of a business bullying a group of artists..." (Kettmann, 1999)
1*5 An article published in the Washington Post quotes Karin Spaink, a judge for the 1996
Prix Arts Electronica, which has been awarded to etoy, criticizing the scope of a judicial
decision in the case that restricted the ability of etoy to sell "stock" in the United States.
(Leiby, 1999)
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level of quotable, embed-able graphic and video artifacts produced by the group allowed
them a level of control over the media narrative that the EDT did not enjoy. Anonymous
is, as a group, difficult for the media to cover, but their cultural artifacts are highly
accessible online. By pushing the production and peer distribution of these artifacts,
which include video manifestos, graphical calls to action, and solidarity images,
Anonymous was able, to a certain extent, dictate the visual tools used in the media's
coverage of Operation Payback.
Operation PayBack was a series of DDOS actions against a variety of entities
that Anonymous perceived as taking hostile action toward Wikileaks. Primarily using the
Low Orbit Ion Cannon tool (which will be examined in detail in a later chapter),
Anonymous targeted more than ten different sites over the course of four days, from
December 6 through December 10, 2010, including those of the Swedish Prosecution
Authority, EveryDNS, senator Joseph Lieberman, MasterCard, two Swedish politicians,
Visa, PayPal, and Amazon.com (Correll, 2010). Many of the sites targeted experienced
at least some amount of downtime.
Unlike the EDT, the electrohippies, and other groups discussed in this thesis,
Anonymous had, in 2010, a reputation, in many ways a purposefully cultivated one, for
being extremely effective and unpleasant trolls with unpredictable methods of choosing
their targets. The majority of the media coverage of Anonymous and Operation Payback
was characterized by an unwillingness to critically assess Anonymous as an activist
group or Operation Payback as an activist action and rampant confusion about the
facts. There was genuine fear that any organization or individual could be Anonymous's
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next target, and very few people were willing to hang a bull's-eye on their back by being
publicly critical of them, particularly, journalists and news organizations that did not fully
understand the technological tactics being so freely deployed. Add to this the fact that
one of Anonymous's primary methods for spreading information about operations and
raids was through the public distribution of slickly produced videos, graphics, and public
social media streams, and the result was, in many cases, news organizations
embedding Anonymous videos and call-to-action posters directly in news stories.
Examples of this could be found in the Washington Post16 (Bell, 2010) and the social
media news site Mashable17 (Erlich, 2010).
The decentralized, leaderless nature of Anonymous made direct coverage of the
group difficult. After all, there were no official spokespeople for the press to rely on, and
there was a constant flow of Pastebin statements, videos, and Photoshopped posters
popping up in all corners of the Internet, all claiming to be from Anonymous. The
extreme horizontal nature of Anonymous meant that literally anyone could claim to
speak for the group, and who was anyone to say it was not true? Anonymous set up a
press channel on one of its IRC servers, where members of the press could chat with
Anons, but many members of the press were simply not aware of it or lacked the
16 In an article entitled, "'Anonymous' attacks Visa.com, Mastercard.com, in support of
WikiLeaks," the Washington Post embedded a call-to-action video entitled, "Operation
Payback #Anonymous Message RE: ACTA, SOPA, PIPA, Internet Censorship &
Copyright," which in turn linked to a Anon-run twitter account.
17 In a post entitled "Operation Payback Targets Amazon.com," Mashable linked to
numerous Twitter accounts which were tweeting scheduling and targeting information,
as well as linking to the Encyclopedia Dramatica page on the Low Orbit Ion Cannon
DDOS tool, in addition to embedded the same call-to-action video that the Washington
Post also embedded.
42
technological skills to access the channel on their own. The combination of the
demands of the 24-hr news cycle and an unpredictable, unreliable subject meant that a
sizable percentage of the coverage was made up of reprinting Anonymous press
releases and posters as journalists scrambled for new material on an almost hourly
basis. Often an Anonymous artifact which had been "legitimated" by one news source
would quickly find its way into others, expanding dramatically the range of influence for
certain artifacts. For example, the Washington Post and Mashable article cited above
both embedded the same call-to-action video, which had originally been linked to by the
New York Times blog, "The Lede" (Bell, 2010). This pattern of news organizations
repeating and homogenizing coverage over the course of an ongoing event fits with the
pattern described by Pablo Boczkowski and Martin de Santos in their 2007 examination
of homogenization in the Argentine print and online news industries. Boczkowski and de
Santos found that online news sites were particularly prone to high levels of "content
overlap" on fast moving stories that demanded repeated updates throughout the day.
Boczkowski and de Santos ascribe this homogeneity of coverage to, "not technology per
se, manifested in the emergence of a new medium, but technical practices, or how
journalists use the technology to make news" (Boczkowski & de Santos, 2007).
Anonymous's continual furnishing of quotable, embeddable, compelling descriptive
content exacerbated an already present system of aggregating from available
information feeds to maintain the constant flow of news content.
This explosion of coverage was a boon to Anonymous in terms of participant
population. Anons have subsequently claimed that during Operation Payback, the
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number of participants active in their IRC channels rose from an average of 70
participants to over 7,000 (Coleman, 2012). It is likely that without this influx of new
participants, the Operation Payback DDOS actions would not have resulted in the
downtime they did.' 8 This substantial increase in active participants during Operation
Payback was, in large part, attributable to the extensive, relatively uncritical media
coverage given to the December stage of Operation Payback.
DDOS as a tool of biographical impact
We've looked at direct action and media manipulation through their specific
theories of change, models of practice, and historical case studies. Another model for
the use of DDOS in activism under consideration is as a tool of "biographical impact."
This is the impact the experience of participation has on the individual activist. Doug
McAdam differentiates between two varieties of biographical impact: conversion and
alternation. He defines "conversion" as "a radical transformation of a person's life,
including their self-conception, network of associations and larger worldview.. .[which]
tends to occur in groups that demand the exclusive loyalties of its members and
maintain a hostile stance toward mainstream society." The milder "alternation" consists
of "identity changes that are not as drastic as conversion.. .which are part of or grow out
of existing programs of behavior." Alternation can take place in groups that are
"relatively more inclusive and tolerant of the other attachment of its members" but which
...can be very demanding of a person's time, energy, and loyalties." The more
18 As addressed in a later chapter, the use of illicit, non-volunteer botnets contributed
substantially to achieved downtime.
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culturally immersive an activist experience is, in terms of exposure to like-minded peers,
the creation of social and technical structures of support and interaction, and the
furnishing of a vocabulary to articulate the experience, the more likely it is to result in
alternation on the part of the individual.
Here is it particularly useful to remember that DDOS is often most effectively
used within the context of a larger campaign, wherein multiple tactics are utilized.
Ideally, these tactics each reinforce a certain ideological stance of the group and
provide opportunities to lead participants from one tactical action to another.
The Culture of Anonymous: biographical impact in Operation Payback
The precise nature of Anonymous is a difficult thing to pin down, but it is best
described as a "culture" (Norton, 2011 a, Auerbach, 2012). Quinn Norton articulates the
characterization of Anonymous-as-culture this way:
It takes cultures to have albums, idioms, and iconography, and I
was swimming in these and more. Anonymous is a nascent and
small culture, but one with its own aesthetics and values, art and
literature, social norms and ways of production, and even its own
dialectic language.
(Norton 2011 a)
Auerbach identifies what he call "A-culture," which broadly encompasses the trolling,
anonymous, internet-based sub-altern counter public of which Anonymous is a part. A-
culture is strongly defined by the online communications technologies on which it was
originally reliant. These technologies were text and static-image based, fundamentally
anonymous in their attribution structure, and "evanescent," containing no archive of
interactions or communications. Core to A-culture, Auerbach observes, are the
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practices of ironizing, recreational offense, self-documentation, elitism, and heightened
meta-awareness, coupled with persistent economies of suspicion and unreality
(Auerbach, 2012). I would add to this highly democratized modes of appropriation-
based production, which while being extremely social and open, operates as an
effective shibboleth into the active culture. Knowledge of and competencies with certain
suites of cultural reference are expected of participants. The ability to actively
participate in the production of cultural artifacts, using a practice-vocabulary based in
the appropriation and remix of images from popular culture and A-culture itself, is also
expected.
The evolution of Anonymous from an inward-facing group concerned with its own
amusement often at the expense of outsiders to an open activist culture adept at
attention-building and attractive to the uninitiated occurred over time, though several
trigger events hastened developments significantly. Prior to the WikiLeaks-related
actions of 2010, Anonymous was known in part for the internet memes that spilled forth
from the board (some examples are rickrolling' 9 and lolcats)20, and in part for intensely
personal harassment campaigns and aggressive "raids" it conducted across the Internet
(Coleman, 2012). Sometimes these raids were DDOS actions; other times they were
site invasions, wherein massive numbers of Anons would converge on a site to
monopolize comment threads or occupy a location in massively multiplayer online
games (Coleman, 2011 b). A key factor was the aesthetic of "doing it for the lulz," an
19 "Rickrolling" is a "bait and switch" meme, wherein a person is tricked into clicking on a
link leading to Rick Astley's 1987 "Never Gonna Give You Up" music video.
20 Lolcats are pictures of cats with humorous text inscribed on them.
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agenda of having fun at the expense of another (Coleman, 2012). Like many active in
hacker and Internet culture, Anons valued free speech and the autonomy of the Internet,
although their early raids were more often than not focused on showing up their target
and generally causing hilarious (to them) chaos.
Beginning in 2008 with Operation Chanology, the actions of Anonymous began to
take on a more overtly political tone. Operation Chanology targeted the Church of
Scientology, initially for attempting to legally force the takedown of a video featuring
Tom Cruise talking about the church, but it later expanded to more general objections to
the church itself (Coleman, 2012; Vichot, 2009). The operation involved DDOS actions
and other digital tactics as well as physical-world street protests. It marked the first
occasion Anonymous raids crossed over into the physical world, with masked Anons
gathering outside Church of Scientology locations in various cities and countries,
holding signs and protesting the church's policies. This was a controversial step among
Anons. Some objected to taking Anon actions to the streets, arguing that Anonymous
should restrict its actions to the online space. Others felt that the political tone of
Operation Chanology was in opposition to the "spirit of the lulz" that had previously
defined Anonymous (Coleman, 2011 a). Operation Chanology represented a shift in the
makeup and tenor of Anonymous. The "lulz" lost its purity, and raids began to represent
a developing political sensibility, one heavily influenced by net libertarianism, free-
21 Previous to this, the Electronic Disturbance Theater, the electrohippies, etoy, and
other groups had used DDOS as a tactic within larger campaigns, often in coordination
with other organizations. Anonymous's internal dispute about coupling street protests
with DDOS actions and other digital tactics is special to Anonymous, and arose in part
because of the "internet-native" nature of the group, which had previously been active
only in the online space.
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speech absolutism, moderate levels of anarchy (Coleman, 2011 a), and a strongly held
belief in the ethical treatment of cats ("Dusty the Cat," 2011).
Anonymous's activist incarnation is primarily represented by two visual icons: the
Guy Fawkes mask, and an empty black suit. Of these, the Guy Fawkes mask has
proven the more durable, and more effective representation. It is also an efficient
metaphor for the identity subsumation that occurs as individuals become involved in
Anonymous actions. Anonymous's conception of identity within the culture is at base a
pluralistic one. The power and attraction of Anonymous is built out of the concept of the
hoard, the mass, the unstoppable wave. "We are legion. We do not forgive. We do not
forget. Expect us," is the unofficial motto of Anonymous. It appears in videos, image
macros, and all manner of viral media produced by and around Anonymous. The phrase
"We are legion" comes from the Gospel of Mark, from the story where Jesus exorcises a
demon from a possessed man. When asked for its name, the demon replies, "aOT("
AsyLlv Ovopd pOL, OTi noXXoL hopPv:" meaning, "I am [called] legion, for we are
many." The original phrase, perhaps better than the Anonymous adaptation, captures
the peculiar nature of the Anonymous identity meme, wherein many different identities
are drawn up and into a single identity. One central source is made more powerful by
the participation of many individuals. But those individual identities move in and out of
different states of participation. Individuals join in under the banner of Anonymous,
temporarily subsuming their personalities under the larger, meta-personality of the
Anonymous hoard.
48
A technological parallel for this, which will be examined in detail in a later
chapter, is the "Hive Mind" mode built into a version of the LOIC DDOS tool, which was
popular during the Operation Payback DDOS actions. When running in Hive Mind
mode, rather than independently targeting and deploying the tool, a participant
choreography familiar from the EDT and the electrohippies use of the independently
controlled FloodNet tool, you could instead place your computer under the control of a
central IRC server. By joining this voluntary botnet, you were able to add your individual
digital voice to the stream of other voices being controlled by an overarching persona: "I
am legion, for we are many."
Three aspects of Anonymous culture and activist practice make it more likely that
individuals who participate in the Operation Payback DDOS actions would experience
alternation or conversion as a result. First, the communications channels used for
planning, publicity, and in-group socializing were often open and public. These included
many IRC channels and various social media accounts. Through IRC and social media
channels, participants were immersed in a like-minded peer community, one in the
throes of an intensely active period whose energy persisted after the end of the
Operation Payback actions. Very shortly after the end of Operation Payback, the Arab
Spring, the HBGary hack, Occupy Wall Street, and other events repeatedly triggered
and reinforced the activist instincts of the Anonymous population, who continued to use
the communications practices used in Operation Payback.
Second, Anonymous visual culture relies on appropriation and remix practices,
liberally quoting from pop culture and from itself in persistent, borderline repetitive
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cycles of production. This means the ability to quickly produce highly relevant cultural
products is easily available to members of the in-group, already privy to the layers of
meaning and reference contained within the symbols. For outsiders, particularly
outsiders in the media, the opaque, hieroglyphic nature of Anonymous visual culture,
which during Operation Payback and its aftermath were experiencing a super-
proliferation online, made the images and videos highly useful for their reductive,
symbolic value. The use by the media of these artifacts of Anonymous visual culture to
represent Anonymous further reinforced their value as meta-symbolic objects within the
culture and made their production a more experientially valuable enterprise. As the
visual culture spread, the ability to repeatedly produce culturally-consistent artifacts
became a more important marker of insider status than simply recognizing or correctly
interpreting specific cultural tropes.
Third, the "hive" model of action valued by Anonymous activists, which requires a
merging of personal agency and identity with a overarching supra-identity structure,
assigns all participants the activist identity, regardless of experience or participation
level. Even "passive" participants whose favored mode of participation was turning on
Hive Mind and walking away were just as important to the success of the action as
those who man their terminals for the duration. Those who had considered themselves
to be an audience in the world of politics and industry could become actors,
strengthened by the invisible yet palpable presence of thousands of their new
comrades-in-arms.
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Each of these factors reinforce each other and channel participants from one
impactful activity to the next. An individual may initially encounter a call-to-action on
Twitter, participate in a DDOS action, and subsequently contribute to planning chats,
collaborative manifesto writing, or video production. Each draws the participant deeper
into the culture and creates more opportunities for biographical impact. Participants
may also dip into one or two activities, or participate once and never return to the
culture. However, the cultural nature of Anonymous actions fosters many opportunities
for participation for those who are interested.
Critical models of DDOS actions
There are also a number of critical models used to describe the use of DDOS in
activism. These models highlight ways in which the use of the tactic can go awry or
become incompatible with other modes of activism. Though most of these criticisms will
be addressed in detail in the ethical framework section, I will briefly describe them here.
The Digitally Correct model: DDOS as censorship
The "censorship" model is a common critical model of DDOS in activism. Most
vocally put forward by hacktivist groups such as Cult of the Dead Cow and Hacktivismo,
Jordan and Taylor (2004) have classified this as the "digitally correct" view, wherein the
integrity of the network and the right of individuals to an unfettered flow of information
take precedence over the political ideals of activism and civil disobedience present in
activist DDOS actions. Hacktivists considered the primary goal of hacktivsm to be
51
defeating state censorship and the disruption of online communications via the creation
and distribution of tools to evade censorious regimes (Jordan and Taylor, 2004; Raley,
2009). Writing in response to various electrohippies DDOS actions, Oxblood Ruffin, a
prominent member of the Cult of the Dead Cow, wrote, "No rationale, even in the
service of the highest ideals, makes [DDOS actions] anything other than what they
are-illegal, unethical, and uncivil. One does not make a better point in an public forum
by shouting down one's opponent" (Ruffin, 2000).
This criticism highlights a difference between hacktivist groups, made up of
hackers who became politically active through writing and distributing code and tools
beginning in the 1990s (Ruffin, 2004), and digitally empowered activists like the EDT
and the electrohippies, who were more often than not experienced activists using
Internet tools and capabilities to supplement more traditional, physical-world actions
(Dominguez, 2009). Hacktivists, coming from a culture that values personal autonomy
and the freedom of information (Wray, 1998), are often strongly opposed to the use of
DDOS, viewing it as an abridgment of free speech. Operating mostly in an environment
made up of digital code and bits, the acceptance of the silencing of bits as a reasonable
tactic of dissent was, and remains, unpalatable to most "old-school" hacktivists (Wray,
1998).
Ruffin was very clear that he did not consider digitally empowered activist groups
like the electrohippies to be operating at the same level or with the same clarity of logic
as his group: "One does not become a hacktivist merely by inserting an 'h' in front of the
word activist or by looking backward to paradigm associated with industrial
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organization." (Ruffin, 2000) And it is true, these groups were not operating along the
same lines of philosophy and practice. Groups such as Cult of the Dead Cow and, later,
Hacktivismo were often engaged in building tools of dubious legality, tools that enabled
users to encrypt their communications, evade fire-walls and censors, and mask their
Internet traffic (Ruffin, 2004). As a result, the security of the project was paramount.
Groups tended to be small and secretive, with definite members rather than a large
amorphous pool of participants. In many jurisdictions, the tools that these groups were
developing were illegal, and using them exposed the user to legal and sometimes
physical risks. It was vital that developers be experienced, skilled coders, and the ranks
of serious hacktivists were closed until one could show he or she had the necessary
skills (Ruffin, 2004). Interestingly, these groups operated in a fashion that more closely
resembled what the Critical Art Ensemble, the primogenitor to the EDT, had envisioned
as the operating model for electronic civil disobedience than what the EDT did. The
Critical Art Ensemble envisioned practitioners of what they termed "electronic civil
disobedience" to operate as small, semiautonomous cells of specialized practitioners,
each performing a specific action or role within a larger organization while
simultaneously maintaining individual identities within the larger group (Critical Art
Ensemble, 1996).
The EDT and the electrohippies were strict proponents of legitimacy through
mass action. Physical world parallels were central to their philosophy of practice in the
online space. Meaning and vitality was drawn from the simultaneous presence and
action of thousands of people, not necessarily any actual or extended effect that action
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may have on the targeted site. In this sense, it was relatively unimportant to groups
such as the EDT whether a given action was "successful," that is, whether it brought
down a site. Stefan Wray notes that FloodNet, the DDOS tool designed and used by the
EDT in the 1990s and early 2000s, rarely resulted in actual downtime for the targeted
sites, and as such, its value lay mostly in the "symbolic gesture" of the "simulated threat"
(Wray, 1998). The number of participants and the amount of media coverage the action
attracted were most relevant to a judgment of "success" or "failure."
The censorship criticism of activist DDOS actions is sometimes valid, as when
the tactic is used against organizations that operate primarily online, such as stand-
alone blogs, file-sharing sites, or ISPs, such as the IGC/Euskal Herria Joumal case,
wherein a large DDOS action was held in order to force an ISP to stop hosting a
particular website. In other instances, the criticism fails to recognize unequal power
dynamics between targets and activists (as when a group of individual activists DDOSes
a multi-national corporation), the presence of alternative outlets of communication, or
the intrinsic value of the DDOSed website to the target. The criticism in many cases
also fails to interrogate how censorship could be practiced, if at all, by entities not
occupying a dominant position in the current power hierarchy. Drawing an equivalency
between the actions of private, non-state actors and censorship, traditionally conceived
of as a state-mediated action, opens up questions about what entities are capable of
performing censorship, particularly in the online space. While DDOS is undoubtedly a
"disruptive" tactic (Costanza-Chock, 2001), disruption does not always equal a denial of
speech rights. Later we will examine examples of DDOS actions where I argue that
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though certain aspects of an organization's data presence were disrupted, their ability to
engage in public speech was not disrupted, causing the censorship conception to fall
flat.
As has been documented by Ethan Zuckerman and others, there are many non-
activist DDOS actions that do readily fit the state-actor censorship model. Zuckerman
catalogued instances where independent media and human rights sites were targeted
by government actors with the goal of driving those sites offline entirely. Due to the high
cost of defending against large scale DDOS actions, and the propensity for ISPs in
certain jurisdictions to view independent media and human rights sites as potential
liabilities, these smaller sites can sometimes be driven offline completely by a DDOS of
relatively short duration (Zuckerman et al., 2010). State-sponsored or state-directed
DDOS actions are not considered to be activist actions in this analysis, and as will be
shown later, a DDOS waged to effect the permanent removal of content is not
considered to be an ethical use of the tactic. But the tactic does have the propensity to
be misused in this fashion.
The Critical Art Ensemble: symbolic dissent is ineffectual
In the 1996 essay, "Electronic Civil Disobedience" (Critical Art Ensemble, 1996),
the Critical Art Ensemble, a performance art and activist group active in the United
States and Europe, posited an evolution on the traditional, physical world model of civil
disobedience. As systems of power migrated from the brick and mortar infrastructure of
physical buildings to reside primarily as data constructs on the internet, the CAE argued,
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so too must systems of resistance and protest. Electronic civil disobedience as
conceived of by the CAE sought to translate the philosophies of disruptive protest from
the physical world to the networked world via a system of small, semi autonomous cells
of specialized practitioners, each performing a specific action or role within a larger
organization, while simultaneously maintaining individual identities within the larger
group (Critical Art Ensemble, 1996). Central to the CAE's vision was the clandestine and
essentially closed nature of the actions, an aspect the CAE terms an "inversion" of
traditional civil disobedience (CAE, 2001). This sprang from a belief that electronic civil
disobedience "is an underground activity that should be kept out of the public/popular
sphere (as in the hacker tradition) and the eye of the media..." because "...there is no
corporate of government agency that is not fully prepared to do battle in the media"
(CAE, 2001). The CAE criticized the actions of groups like the Electronic Disturbance
Theater (a spin-off from the CAE) and others for engaging in public, spectacle-oriented
"simulated" actions over "clandestine policy subversion" and direct action.
The CAE felt that the mass-action, media spectacle tactics that the EDT
employed, including their use of DDOS actions as attention directors, would ultimately
be completely ineffectual at effecting change in corporate and government actors.
However, this criticism lifts the tactic out of the context of larger actions or campaigns it
might be associated with. As I argue later in this paper, it is important to consider the
tactic in context. The validity of the tactic is equally dependent on the activist structure
that surrounds it as any qualities inherent in itself. Moreover, DDOS actions were not
primarily conceived of as stand-alone actions. EDT member Stephen Wray notes "we
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are likely to see a proliferation of hybridized actions that involve a multiplicity of tactics,
combining actions on the street and actions in cyberspace" (Wray quoted in Raley,
2009). To divest DDOS of its "component" nature (Raley, 2009) is to place on its
shoulders a weight of ontological justification that no tactic alone could bear.
Similar to the censorship criticism leveled by the hacktivist groups, the CAE's
criticism of DDOS as ineffective is as much a description of the different goals and
operating philosophies at work between these types of activist organization as it is an
autonomous critique.
How will we know when we've won?
Critics of DDOS activist actions routinely raise the question of measures of
success. At a technological level, it is becoming more and more difficult for volunteer-
based DDOS action to cause any downtime on major corporate sites. It would be
virtually impossible for such an action to crash a modern site without technological
augmentation. This is not a new development, even in the early 2000s, the FloodNet
powered DDOS actions run by the EDT rarely resulted in downtime (Wray, 1998). So if
denial-of-service caused by server downtime is an unlikely result of an activist DDOS
action, what then is an appropriate measure of the success of any given action?
In this, the CAE's criticism of DDOS actions as symbolic and simulated reverses
to become its virtue. When used within a broader action to expand opportunities for
engagement and participation, DDOS tactics create what Foucault termed a "plurality of
resistances," each action being a provocation with not-necessarily-certain desired result
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(Foucault, 1990). Ricardo Dominguez termed this phenomenon "permanent cultural
resistance; there is no endgame" (Dominguez quoted in Raley, 2009). The value of this
symbolic resistance is not necessarily in its overt effect on the system it ostensibly
targets, but rather in its effects on its participants and on the reflective fields that
surround it as it occurs, including media and culture. Particularly in its value as tool of
biographical impact, DDOS acts tool for the revelation of "hidden transcripts" of
resistance (Scott, 1990). As previously described, this is particularly apparent in the
case of the Anonymous Operation Payback, wherein the vast majority of the actions and
organization took place online among individuals who had not met in the physical world.
As a tactic whose strength is in the digitized power of a crowd, the DDOS serves as an
open action wherein individual participants "recognize the full extent to which their
claims, their dreams, their anger is shared by other subordinates with whom they have
not been in direct touch" (Scott, 1990). This is a quality which will become increasingly
valuable as digital activism continues to be unbounded by state borders and moves
towards a transnational operational norm.
Conclusions
Direct action, media manipulation, and biographical impact are three major
theories behind the use of DDOS as an activist tactic. Though technologically
undifferentiated, activist DDOS actions can be strikingly different from each other
depending on the theories and practice models used to animate them. While a direct
action DDOS aims to disrupt and provoke a response spectacle, a media manipulation
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DDOS looks to direct media coverage away from the novelty of the activist action and
towards a larger issue. When used as a tool of biographical impact, DDOS actions
serve to draw participants deeper into a particular activist culture, where different modes
of participation can be introduced. As each of these theories and models positions
DDOS differently within activism, they also embrace different assumptions about the
best activist use of the online space, as do the critical models I described. These
models are not mutually exclusive, though some critics of activist DDOS actions may
describe them that way. It's true that DDOS can and repeatedly has been used in
extortionist, repressive, and censorious ways by criminals, state governments, and
other bad actors. However, the potential for misuse should not preemptively condemn
all potential uses of the tactic. As the first three sections of this chapter have shown,
motivating theories for DDOS actions exist beyond the simple extortion-censorship-
harassment continuum. In the next chapter, I'll look at how the design of tools used in




A Comparative Analysis of DDOS Tool Design
In this section, I will be tracing the development of the Electronic Disturbance
Theater's FloodNet DDOS tool and Anonymous's family of LOIC DDOS tools,
highlighting where their functionalities overlap and diverge. The language and memes
used in the tool interfaces are of particular interest here, as they can be analyzed to
show the lineage and intended audience for the tool. I will be analyzing FloodNet and
two iterations of the LOIC tool, one developed contemporaneously with Operation
Chanology and a later version used during Operation Payback. Much of the
functionality present in LOIC was present in FloodNet.
As activist events, DDOS actions tend to be undertheorized by organizers,
participants, and academics. Though the previous chapter was an attempt to address
that at the level of social movement theory, this chapter uses the technological tools
used during these actions as an additional point for the analysis of these actions. Rather
than looking at them on a purely technological level, this chapter examines these tools
in the context of activist actions and communities, at how their existence impacts
campaigns. For DDOS actions, the tool used is often serves a central, unifying function.
It represents a shared jumping off point for the action. The design and affordances of
the tool used can define a variety of aspects of the actions, including the level of
engagement expected from participants, as well as indicating, after the fact, the types of
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individuals who were recruited and active, and the amount of political "seriousness"
indicated by the action.
The Electronic Disturbance Theater and FloodNet
The FloodNet tool was created in 1998 by the EDT and operated by exploiting
the Java applet reload function. Participants ran FloodNet from a browser window by
navigating to a specific page and allowing the tool to run in the background (Wray,
1998). "Messages" could also be sent to a target website by using FloodNet to insert
"404_file not found" messages into the target server's error logs. A participant would
choose a target from a list of preselected options, type a short message, and hit "Send."
FloodNet would request a file from the target server that corresponded to the message
text, causing a 404 error log to be generated. For example, the message "human
rights" would generate the error message "human-rights not found on this server"
(Jordan & Taylor, 2004). This performative "messaging" functionality would also appear
in Anonymous's LOIC DDOS tool. Although it was possible that these generated
messages could be seen by someone at the targeted organization, that person was
likely to be a systems administrator, not a person in a position of power. Consequently,
these messages serve primarily as an one-way outlet for the participant rather than a
tool of communication. This was replicated during the Operation Payback action as well.
22 A "404 error" is the hypertext transfer protocol response code generated by a server
when the file being searched for cannot be located. Such an error would be logged by
the server in logs that could be accessed by a systems administrator later.
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Figure 1: A screenshot of the web based version of the EDT's FloodNet DDOS tool.
The EDT held thirteen pro-Zapatista actions in 1998 using FloodNet, targeting
websites ranging from those of the Clinton White House and the Pentagon to those of
Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, with mixed
success. These actions attracted up to 18,000 participants but did not generate much
focused media attention (Dominguez, 2009). On the 1st of January 1999, the source
code for the FloodNet tool was released, allowing other groups to use the tool in their
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own actions.23 Its design was simple and for the most part undifferentiated version to
version. The language used in the interface clearly marked the tool as belonging to a
particular population of activists and artists who were familiar with the language and
practices of street and media activism (see Figure 1).
The version used in the pro-Zapatista actions of 1998 invited users to "send your
own message to the error log of the institution/symbol of Mexican Neo-Liberalism of
your choice," specialized language that creates a gulf between those who already
understand it and those who do not. The tool does not appear to have been designed to
appeal to users who were not already interested in and informed about the issue at
hand. This impression is underscored by the methods by which the EDT publicized its
actions: through mailing lists and message boards frequented by media activists and
special interest lists devoted to South America, the Zapatistas, and other related topics.
Similarly, as previously addressed, in its attempt to translate the physical world sit-in to
the online space, FloodNet clings to a one-person/one-computer operations model,
refusing to augment the resulting flow of traffic with tools such as botnets (volunteer or
otherwise) or other traffic amplification exploits (Jordan & Taylor, 2004). This tied the
ethical validity of their actions, and eventually of DDOS itself as a tactic, to how closely
they could be compared to physical-world actions. As I will show, the Anonymous tool
was unconstrained by these technical limitations, which complicates any comparisons
made between its actions and physical sit-ins.
23 It was this version that the electrohippies later adapted for their WTO action.
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Anonymous, Operation Payback, and LOIC
Operation Payback and the events that precipitated it highlight the differences in
motivation and effects of DDOS actions with regard to the active removal of content
versus an attempt to attract attention to an issue. The action began in September of
2010 as what Anonymous claimed was a retaliatory DDOS campaign targeting the
MPAA, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), and other targets after
those organizations had taken the legally dubious step of hiring an Indian firm to DDOS
the Pirate Bay, a file-sharing website (Anderson, 201 0).24 Anonymous viewed the DDOS
actions by the RIAA and the MPAA as a threat to file sharing and torrenting and as a
further example of the abuses perpetrated by the corporate content and IP industries.
Specifically, the use of DDOS tactics by the RIAA in an attempt to completely disable
the Pirate Bay, which only existed in its online state, while Anons had been imprisoned
for launching DDOS actions against the websites of the Church of Scientology, which
existed primarily in the physical world as a complex organization, seemed breathtakingly
hypocritical. A group of Anons called AnonOps led the DDOS actions against the RIAA,
MPAA, and Aiplex, which continued for more than a month. All three targets reported
downtime (Anderson, 2010).
The Pirate Bay action and the Anonymous action against the websites of the
MPAA and the RIAA had strikingly different motivations and actual effects. The
24 The Motion Picture Association of America and the Recording Industry Association of
America are the major lobbying groups for the content industry and have a history of
litigiously opposing what they consider to be the theft of their content via peer-to-peer
file- sharing sites, such as the Pirate Bay.
25 Torrenting is a method of peer-to-peer file sharing that allows individuals to download
large files, broken up into pieces, from several different servers at the same time.
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motivation behind the attack-for-hire on the Pirate Bay was to remove content from the
Internet, in this case, torrent files available on the Pirate Bay's servers (Anderson,
2010). The Pirate Bay exists as an online resource. It has no public presence beyond its
Internet presence and serves no function beyond making certain files available online.
The motivation of the DDOS actions was not to call attention to the issue of online file
sharing but to obliterate the organizational entity known as the Pirate Bay. Alternatively,
the RIAA and the MPAA do not exist primarily online. Their websites are little more than
informational homepages. No business is conducted there, and the hearts of the
organizations do not reside online. The stated motivation for the Anonymous actions on
the MPAA and the RIAA was to disrupt their operations and cause the organizations to
spend money and resources fending off the actions (Anderson, 2010), but the primary
benefit of the actions lay in the media attention and new participants it attracted, who
sympathized with Anonymous's views and could participate in future actions. It
functioned, in part because of media coverage as a recruiting drive.
December 6, 2010, marked the beginning second stage of Operation Payback,
sometimes known as Operation Avenge Assange. This second wave of DDOS actions
targeted organizations and individuals Anonymous believed were acting against the
interests of WikiLeaks, either by cutting off its channels of financial support, by refusing
to provide hosting to the website and its domain name, or by speaking out against the
organization publicly. Over the course of four days, Anonymous's DDOS actions against
over a dozen sites, causing downtime and service outages at several (Correll, 2010).
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These actions were powered by volunteers using the LOIC DDOS tool and were
augmented by nonvolunteer botnets (Coleman, 2012; Olson, 2012).
The program used during the Anonymous DDOS action, LOIC, is similar to
FloodNet but differs in significant ways. By the time LOIC was developed, the basic
functionality of automated DDOS programs had evolved to match improvements in
website infrastructure. Beyond that, more important shifts had been made in the areas
of community development and open-source coding projects and platforms. LOIC was
"forked" several times, allowing the creation of different versions of the tool adapted to
the needs and preferences of different user groups. 26 Not only did LOIC represent an
evolutionary step in the development of activist-oriented DDOS tools overall, but it
continued to evolve within the context of Anonymous during the course of Operation
Chanology and Operation Payback.
LOIC was originally developed and distributed by a developer known as praetox
(Norton, 2011 b) as a server "stress-testing"27 tool. A number of different versions of the
tool based on praetox's original code were developed, some of which added new
functionalities to the tool or adapted it to run in different environments. I group those
projects that are based on praetox's original code and that retain the LOIC name and
the core functionality with the name LOIC, although I will be examining some of the
forks individually, as they reflect the previously examined shifts in the Anonymous
26 To "fork" an open-source software project is to take the source code from one project
and independently develop it, thus creating a separate piece of software. The LOIC
forks reflect distinct differences in affordances and design.
27 As mentioned in the introduction, it's likely that this tool was never strictly intended to
be used as a legitimate stress-testing tool, and the classification is instead a useful
cover for the tool actual purpose: to disrupt the websites of others.
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population, strategy, and political goals. The evolution of this particular tool further
serves as a case study in the mainstreaming of DDOS as a tool of political protest.
A Forked Comparison: abatishchev and NewEraCracker
When the first version of LOIC was made available on the Internet is difficult to
determine, but it was in use in 2008, during Operation Chanology (Coleman, 2011 b). In
the next 2 years, different versions of the project began popping up on open-source
software development sites. Versions of LOIC could be downloaded from SourceForge
and GitHub, popular open-source software repositories. Individuals could also add code
to LOIC projects on these sites (a practice known as "committing code" or "code
commits"), leave comments for the developers, request features, and report bugs. As
such, they were far more social in their development and distribution than FloodNet.
Use of those development community websites meant that more people con-currently
participated in the development of LOIC, making it possible for the tools to more
accurately reflect the needs, whims, and tastes of the target audience. By December of
2010, versions of LOIC could be run on Windows, Mac, and Linux PCs as well as
Android phones and jail-broken iPhones. A version called JS LOIC, or JavaScript LOIC,
ran, like the EDT's FloodNet application, from within a web browser; the user was not
required to download or install anything (Warren, 2010).
The most widely downloaded versions of LOIC in December of 2010 were posted
to SourceForge and GitHub by abatishchev and NewEraCracker, respectively. These
two versions will be examined because they represent a particular line of evolution for
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the tool, were very often linked in media coverage and LOIC tutorials, and were
extremely popular, if one counts by download numbers. Both hewed closely to praetox's
original code while updating the graphical user interface (GUI) and adding features. The
version from abatishchev is the older of the two, initially uploaded to SourceForge in
June of 2009 (abatishchev, SourceForge Stats, n.d.). This version of LOIC was
downloaded 116,988 times in December, 2010, up from 61,936 times in at the
beginning of Operation Payback in September (abatishchev, SourceForge Stats, n.d.;
see Figures 2 and 3). To compare, in August of 2010, before the launch of the first wave
of Operation Payback, this version of LOIC was downloaded 5,318 times (abatishchev,
SourceForge Stats, n.d.). Together, the September 2010 (when Operation Payback
initially began) through December 2010 (when the Avenge Assange portion of
Operation Payback took place) downloads make up nearly a third of the 567,476
downloads abatishchev's version of LOIC racked up from June of 2009 to October of
20011 (abatishchev, SourceForge stats, n.d.; see Figure 2). Just under a third of those
downloads occurred during the week of Operation Payback's Avenge Assange
campaign. It is impossible to tell from SourceForge records how many of those
downloading the tool actually used it during the course of Operation Payback, but it is
an impressive and telling spike.
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Figure 2. This SourceForge chart shows downloads of the abatishchev LOIC from June
2009 through October 1, 2011. The first spike in the highlighted portion is September
2010, at the start of the Operation Payback. The second, larger spike is December
2010. From September through December, 2010, abatishchev's LOIC was downloaded
191,781 times. Retrieved from http://sourceforge.net/projects/loic/files/stats/timeline
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Figure 3. This SourceForge chart shows the December 2010 downloads of
abatishchev's LOIC program. The highlighted portion shows the duration of Operation
Payback's Avenge Assange actions, starting with an action against the Swedish
banking website postfinance.ch on December 6 and ending with an action against
conservatives4palin.com on December 10. During the campaign's weeklong run in
December, 2010, abatishchev's LOIC was downloaded 58,795 times, accounting for
half the total downloads for the month, and just under a third of the total downloads from
the September through December 2010 period. Retrieved from
http://sourceforge.net/projects/loic/files/stats/timeline
NewEraCracker uploaded his version of LOIC to GitHub in late September 2010, stating
clearly that his work was based on abatishchev's version of the original praetox tool, as
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was written in the project's README file:28 "Low Orbit Ion Cannon-An open source
network stress tool, written in C#. Based on Praetox's loic project at
https://sourceforge.net/projects/loic/" (NewEraCracker, n.d.). From its creation in
September 2010 to December 2011, NewEraCracker's version of the tool was
downloaded 80,660 times (unfortunately, GitHub does not currently offer finer-grain
analytics on projects) (NewEraCracker, n.d.).
Figure 4. A screenshot of abatishchev's version of LOIC. Retrieved from
http://sourceforge.net/projects/Ioic/
28 The README file for NewEraCracker's version of LOIC is available at
https://github.com/NewEraCracker/LOIC#readme Note that NewEraCracker credits
Praetox but links to abatishchev's SourceForge project.
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Figure 5. A screenshot of NewEraCracker's version of LOIC. Retrieved from
https://github. com/NewEraCracker/LOIC!
Although NewEraCracker's and abatishchev's tools share virtually identical GUls
and core functionalities, there are differences in the design and functionality of each tool
that would be recognized by and appeal to different participant groups. Both employ the
same color scheme, dark blue on black with white text, and use the same image of a
futuristic laser weapon firing at a planet, although different fonts are used for the Low
Orbit Ion Cannon moniker. Both GUIs are peppered with references to memes and
video games that would be instantly recognizable to individuals associated with
Anonymous or familiar with Internet meme culture, although the references differ
between the two versions in ways that make the tools temporally and politically
distinct.29 These differences can be used to position the different versions of the tool in
29A meme is an idea, phrase, image, or other concept that spreads virally over the
Internet and is adopted, repeated, and remixed by people. In Anonymous culture, many
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time and how DDOS was being used by Anonymous in terms of its activist strategy. For
instance, the phrase "A cat is fine, too," which appears as the default message in the
transmission-control protocol/user datagram protocol (TCP/UDP) message field in the
abatishchev version (see Figure 6), began appearing on 4chan and /b/ in 2006 ("A Cat
is Fine Too," 2009). "Desudesudesu," also included in the TCP/UDP message field,
references a separate meme, also popular on 4chan in 2006 ("Desu," 2009).
NewEraCracker replaces that message with "U dun goofed," a reference to the Jessi
Slaughter meme, which became widespread during the summer of 2010 ("Jessi
Slaughter," 2010) (see Figure 7). The abatishchev version also includes the subtitle
"When harpoons, air strikes and nukes fail," a reference to the video game series
Command and Conquer, from which the name "Low Orbit Ion Cannon" is taken.
fi -0W"C MWO -a
Figure 6. In this screenshot of abatishchev's LOIC, the TCP/UDP messaging field is
highlighted, with the default message, 'A cat is fine too. Desudesudesu."
memes serve as markers of community involvement, shibboleths to differentiate those
who are part of the community from those who are not.
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Figure 7. In this screenshot of NewEraCracker's LOIC, note the highlighted change in
the TCP/UDP's default message, from "A cat is fine too" to "U dun goofed."
One reference the abatishchev and NewEraCracker versions share in common is
the "IMMA CHARGIN MAH LAZER" phrase, splashed across the button one presses to
launch the attack. This references the Shoop Da Whoop meme, which also originated
on the 4chan /b/ board in 2006 ("Shoop da Whoop," 2009). Whereas "IMMA CHARGIN
MAH LAZER" and "U dun goofed" enjoyed widespread popularity beyond 4chan, "A cat
is fine, too" references an obscure bestiality meme derived from Japanese manga. It did
not achieve recognition or popularity beyond 4chan and similar image boards, such as
SomethingAwful and YTMND. Given the proliferation of 2006 Internet memes in the
older versions of LOIC, and given that 2006 predates any significant media coverage of
Anonymous or 4chan, it is reasonable to assume that the original developer of LOIC
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was most likely active on /b/ and with Anonymous, saw the target audience as members
of the same community, and developed the tool sometime during 2006.
These two versions of LOIC are semiotically tagged with memes popular within
different populations at the time of development. The abatishchev and, theoretically,
original praetox versions reflect memes that occurred predominantly within the
community of /b/ and 4chan and did not leak out into the wider Internet culture. The
NewEraCracker version replaced those more obscure references, either because the
developer did not recognize them or because he wanted to explicitly realign the cultural
references of the tool with memes that had attracted the attention of the more
mainstream Internet culture. At the time, the Jessi Slaughter "U dun goofed" meme had
attracted the attention of popular Internet culture blogs, such as Gawker, and the
mainstream news media ("Jessi Slaughter," 2010). So marked, NewEraCracker's
version of LOIC can be seen as appealing more to individuals who had relatively little
interest in the more recreationally offensive aspects of /b/'s culture but were drawn to
Anonymous for other, perhaps predominantly political, reasons.o
The changes rmade by NewEraCracker also heighten the explicit and overt
political value of the tool. Whereas "A cat is fine, too" and "Desudesudesu" are relatively
nonsensical in the context of an adversarial DDOS attack, "U dun goofed" is explicitly
confrontational. It accuses the target of making a grave error and implies that he or she
is now, or shortly will be, suffering the consequences of his or her actions. In the original
viral video from which the meme sprang, "U dun goofed" is followed shortly by the line
30 This shift in rhetorical tone can also be interpreted as a reflection of Anonymous's
overall move away from its 4chan roots, towards a new activist identity.
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"The consequences will never be the same" ("Jessi Slaughter," 2010). So whereas the
praetox and abatishchev LOIC can be seen as calling out to a specific, rather limited
group of like-minded individuals, the NewEraCracker LOIC throws its net much more
broadly and advertises its vengeful motives much more overtly. This messaging
functionality is identical to the one found in the original FloodNet tool. The message
many never be seen by the target and, as such, serves more as a rhetorical flourish for
the benefit of the sender, adding a weight that might not be carried by the hurling of bits
alone, and augments the sense of communal participation.
The design of the interface makes the operation of the tool relatively simple, even
for someone with little experience participating in DDOS actions, but it also contains
features for more advanced users to "personalize" their actions. The required steps
(target, attack mode, and some customizable options) are numbered 1 to 3. A website
can be targeted by entering either its URL or its IP address. A more advanced user can
also set the port destination, the number of simultaneously open threads, request
timeout, and the relative speed with which packets are hurled at the target. Most of
these options have a default setting, so all an inexperienced user has to do is enter a
target URL, click "IMMA CHARGIN MAH LAZER," and sit back. However, if a user were
still confused, there are a myriad of tutorials and FAQs available online, posted on
webpages and as video tutorials on YouTube. Information on how to operate LOIC is,
and in December of 2010 was, extremely easy to find. In fact, much of the news
coverage of Operation Payback and Operation Avenge Assange contained enough
information to constitute a tutorial on the use of LOIC in and of itself.
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A significant difference between the abatishchev and NewEraCracker versions of
LOIC is NewEraCracker's addition of the Hive Mind automated attack mode (see Figure
8).
Figure 8. In this screenshot of NewEraCracker's LOIC, note the addition of "FUCKING
HIVE MIND" and attendant options at the top of the interface.
This added functionality also represents a important advancement from FloodNet,
which, like abatishchev's LOIC, operated in only one "manual" mode. Although the tool
automated the process of sending packets, a user still had to target and engage the tool
manually. Hive Mind mode allowed the tool be controlled remotely, through the IRC 31
protocol. During Hive Mind mode, the user was essentially volunteering his or her
machine to be part of a botnet. To operate in this mode, the user simply selected "Hive
31 IRC, or Internet Relay Chat, is an internet protocol to support instant messaging, chat,
and synchronous conferencing. IRC channels are be hosted on a central server and
joined by individuals via clients or an online interface. Hive Mind exploited the IRC
protocol to control an instance of LOIC on a given machine.
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Mind" at the top of the interface and entered the IP address of the IRC server, the port
number, and the channel name. These were also set to defaults during installation,
further simplifying the process. Moreover, nearly all of Anonymous's internal
communications during the December stage of Operation Payback took place in IRC
channels, so it is very likely that even a relatively new participant would be passingly
familiar with its protocols (Norton, 2011 b). But again, if a user were confused, there
were, and still are, many tutorials to be had just a Google search away.
The Hive Mind feature represents a significant break with the one-person/one-
computer protocol practice exemplified by FloodNet. Although an original goal of the
FloodNet project might have been to "leave one's computer protesting at home and then
hit the streets to do the same" (Dominguez, 2009, p. 1810), it was Anonymous that
actually took advantage of the protocol's physics-defying potential. Hive Mind mode
enabled Anonymous to engage with participants who did not, for whatever reason,
follow the targeting and scheduling information that Anonymous was constantly
releasing and updating. A lower level of commitment was required. Although Anons may
not have "hit the streets" as EDT envisioned, Hive Mind mode did enable them to go to
school, work, sleep, or anywhere while still participating in DDOS actions as they
arose. 32
By updating and making more accessible the memes in the tool's interface, and
by adding functionality that allowed less technically able individuals to participate in the
32 This functionality was anticipated during the Help Israel Win campaign, a DDOS
action launched in late 2008 that featured a voluntary botnet similar to LOIC's Hive
Mind. The Help Israel Win campaign will be examined in Chapter 5.
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actions, Anonymous was able to expand its participant community dramatically.
Coleman (2012) quotes one Anon as saying that the number of participants on the
Operation Payback IRC servers rose from an average of 70 participants to over 1000.
The ease with which one could participate in the Operation Payback actions was rivaled
only by the ease with which one could take on the identity of an Anon. As noted
previously, the Anonymous identity meme is based on the strengthening of a central
core via the participation of many individuals who move in and out of different active or
passive states. This subsumption of personal agency has the potential for a strong
biographical impact on the participants, particularly, those who had not previously
considered themselves political actors, by merging their agency with other active
participants. This merging allows for the temporary sharing of an activist identity, which
subsequently becomes more easily adopted by those participants who opt to remain
involved.
Conclusions
The choices made in the design and distribution of the tools used for activist
DDOS actions have a strong impact on various aspects of the campaigns. Who
participates and how, the political engagement of the action, and the likelihood that
participants will stay involved can all be affected by these decisions. Close analysis of
these tools after the fact can also provide indications as to the political philosophies and
theories animating these protests. Any attempt to examine political and social
movements within the online space should make room for the analysis of the tools and
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other technological artifacts, such as meeting places and communication protocols,
used in these movements. In this analysis, I've shown how the actions of Anonymous
do not constitute the breaking of some new political ground, but rather represent the
continued evolution of political activism in the digital space, specifically in the realm of
tool design. In the movement from the Electronic Disturbance Theater's FloodNet to
Anonymous's LOIC, we have seen how this realm of online activism expanded from one
dominated by experienced activists organizing relatively small populations of like-
minded individuals to a horizontal structure that opens the tools and mechanisms of
protest to anyone with an internet connection. In the next chapter, I'll examine how
participant identity functions within activist DDOS actions.
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CHAPTER 3
Participant Identity in Context
Crowd based actions, like DDOSes, blockades, and public marches, are not based
on the discreet identities of individual participants to be successful. Rather, the visual
spectacle of the mass (or, in the case of DDOS, the imagined spectacle) is more
valuable than the individual as a self-contained entity in the greater campaign. That
said, a variety of identity constructions, revelations, and concealments come into play
with DDOS actions. A highly debated aspect of DDOS actions is their propensity to
enable anonymous action, wherein people take active steps to conceal their identity
over the course of their participation. This can be compared to the wearing of masks
during a street protest. Other identity performances beyond anonymity have historically
come into play with regard to DDOS actions, such as Anonymous's highly theatrical
adoption of a stereotyped "hacker" identity in its actions. This section will examine
practices of overt identification and anonymization; the construction of collective,
performative identities within activist groups; issues of gender, race, and class as
played out in a technologically defined activist space; and how the concept of
unsympathetic actors and "impure dissent," as defined by Tommie Shelby, applies to
modern DDOS actions as they are practiced in the contemporary, privatized online
space.
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Identity, anonymity, and responsibility within protest
Early groups, like the Electronic Disturbance Theater and the electrohippies
explicitly revealed and advertised the identity of the organizers of DDOS actions. They
did this in support of their explicit modeling of their DDOS action on physical world sit-
ins, which contain within their operational logic a give-and-take with the state. This is in
contrast to more recent DDOS actions, particularly those of the group Anonymous, who
maintain anonymity as a aspect of their culture. The anonymity of Anonymous actions
is also a reflection of their refusal to engage with the mechanisms of the government on
government's terms. Anonymous refuses to buy that the government is engaging with
digital activism in good faith, and moreover denies that the current form of the state has
any legitimate role in governing the net at all.
Both the EDT and the electrohippies explicitly revealed and advertised their
identities as organizers of DDOS actions. This tactic of preemptive identification was
yet another aspect of their adaptation of physical world protest tactics for the online
space. As articulated by the electrohippies:
We have nothing to hide, as we believe that our purpose is
valid, and so we do not seek to hide it from any authorities who
seek to surveil us. Likewise, we do not try to bury our identities
from law enforcement authorities, any authority could, if it chose
to, track us down in a few hours.. .The right to take action
against another entity on the 'Net must be balanced with the
principle of accountability."
(DJNZ, 2000)
the electrohippies claimed that by openly revealing their identities as organizers,
they could be held accountable by the public whose participation they were seeking.
Further, they claimed that such accountability ensured that the tactic would only be used
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in "justifiable" situations: "If the group using the tool do not feel they can be open about
its use then we consider that their action cannot be considered justifiable. A justifiable
action cannot be mounted from behind the mask of anonymity." (DJNZ, 2000). They
also viewed the practice as a hedge against accusations of terrorism or criminality by
the state or press.
In their essay analyzing their use of what they termed "client-side distributed denial
of service" and in other writings, the electrohippies repeatedly frame their use of DDOS
as a natural continuation of existing constitutional rights. Like the EDT, the activists saw
the online space as a complementary, equally valid theater of activism to the physical
world, and approached it as such with the assumption that if previously accepted activist
practices, like sit-ins, were symmetrically adapted to the online space, the reactions of
the state could be predicted.
These groups did not require participants to publicly identify themselves to the same
degree as organizers; the electrohippies recommended the use of anonymous, throw-
away email addresses for their WTO email-bombing campaign. However, the groups
did acknowledge the likelihood and potential consequences of being identified as a
participants in these actions, as stated on the EDT's website:
WARNING: This is a Protest, it is not a game, it may have
personal consequences as in any off-line political manifestation
on the street:
Based on critiques from the Heart Hackers and other individuals
about FloodNet:
1. Your IP address will be harvested by the government
during any FloodNet action. When you click and enter FloodNet
your name and political position will be made known to the
authorities.
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(Similar to having your picture taking during a protest action on
the street.)
2. Possible damage to your machine may occur because of
your participation in the FloodNet action.
(Just as in a street action -the police may come and hurt you.)
3. FloodNet clogs bandwidth and may make it difficult for
many individuals using small pipelines around the world to get
information. FloodNet may not impact the targeted website
specifically as much as it disrupts traffic going to the targeted
website, i.e. problems for Internet routes to the site.
(This also happens when people take to the streets. Individuals
may find themselves unable to get to work or buy a newspaper
because of the action. FloodNet actions are short term and only
disturb bandwidth during the time of the manifestation. The
Electronic Disturbance Theater feels that even if FloodNet only
functions as a symbolic action, that is enough to make the
collective presence of activists felt beyond the electronic
networks.)
We hope that when you join our Virtual Sit-in's in support of
global communities of resistance, you will take the above
information to heart.
(Electronic Disturbance Theater, 199833)
The EDT and the electrohippies's reliance on physical world structures of
accountability indicate a belief that the assumptions of physical world activism hold true
for activism in the online space as well, particularly assumptions around interactions
with the state and its agents. The EDT's warning acknowledges the expected role law
enforcement typically plays in street activism. In this conception, the state serves as a
theatrical antagonist and legitimater of dissent by virtue of their reaction: as stated by
33 The FloodNet warning page was posted in September, 1998, and developed by
Carmin Karasic and Brett Stalbaum. It is archived at
http://www.thing.net/~rdom/zapsTactical/warning.htm and was last accessed on April
13, 2013.
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Jerry Rubin in 1969, "The cops are a necessary part of any demonstration theater.
When you are planning a demonstration, always include a role for the cops. Cops
legitimize demonstrations." (Rubin, 1969) Similarly, in his original conception of civil
disobedience, when Thoreau says, "Under a government which imprisons any unjustly,
the true place for a just man is also a prison," (Thoreau, 1849) he values the spectacle
of the state imprisoning a just man for its value as an illustration of the injustice of the
state, to which others may react. Encounters with law enforcement of a certain type are
seen as a necessary and sometimes useful part of activist actions.
Symbolic activism of the type practiced by the EDT and other co-temporaneous
groups requires a dialog with the state to be effective. The state is assumed to be able
to respond to the activist action in good faith, as it is understood to be activism. The
state is seen as having an interest in engaging with activists productively, and moreover
is seen as a useful actor in the process that activists are trying to impact.34
Contrary to this, Anonymous holds anonymity to be a core aspect of its culture.
Individuals who out themselves are derisively referred to as "name-fags" and can
sometimes be reacted to quite aggressively (Coleman, 2012). Auerbach, as previously
noted, lays the credit for this cultural development at the feet of the technological
systems upon which the Anonymous culture was built, fast-moving message boards
which were ephemeral and unsigned by nature. While this explains where the value
34 In this vein, the EDT's Zapatista actions provoked aggressive counter-measures from
the Pentagon, in the form of a "counter-hack" which redirected and tied up the EDT's
systems (Denning, 2000) Later, in early 2010, EDT member Ricardo Dominguez was
investigated for leading a "virtual sit-in" action against the official website of the
University of California Office of the President.
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originated, it does not explain why it has penetrated so deeply into the culture's activist
activities, nor why it has persisted at the levels of both technological systems and
cultural practice.
Anonymous's maintenance of anonymity in the face of established activist
practice in part indicates a refusal to accept the assumptions of earlier groups. While
the EDT and the electrohippies inherently granted the rights of states to govern the
online as they govern the physical world, Anonymous does not. Anonymous's political
conception of the internet, in so much as it coherently stands, is more akin to that
articulated by John Perry Barlow in his 1996 "A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace":
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You
are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we
gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one,
so I address you with no greater authority than that with which
liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we
are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you
seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do
you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason
to fear.
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did
not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world.
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that
you can build it, as though it were a public construction project.




Anonymity, in this context, becomes a political response to the perceived
illegitimacy of state governance online. During the Operation Chanology street protests
against the Church of Scientology, Anonymous encouraged participants to wear masks
to protect themselves against later harassment by the Church. During Operation
Payback and later actions, the use of anonymity during a DDOS action incorporates
within it a refusal to engage with traditional scripts of activism that inherently legitimize
the role of the state and of law enforcement within the action.
In addition to simply denying the legitimacy of the state in governing dissent
online, anonymity as an online activist practice contains within it a belief that the state
and corporate actors targeted by the activists will not respond in good faith (Shelby,
2012). Earlier groups drew on the history and scripts of street activism to anticipate
interactions with states and law enforcement. Anonymous, operating some ten years
later, draws on a much different history of state antagonism of hackers, DRM battles,
and post-9/1 1 War on Terror surveillance and policing of dissent. Given the history in
the US of frankly ridiculous and over-reaching CFAA-enabled computer crime
prosecutions, this assumption of bad faith is not unreasonable. This is similar to the
rationale behind the use of masks by Black Bloc actors during street actions.
Thompson quotes Black Bloc activists citing "protect[ing] ourselves from illegal police
surveillance" and "provid[ing] cover for activists engaged in illegal actions during the
demo" (Thompson, 2010 p. 57) as reasons for the use of masks during street protests.
The logic is clear: if you aim is to commit a political act not recognized as a privileged
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political act by the state, then taking actions to prevent yourself as a political actor from
being assigned the role of criminal actor by the state is reasonable.
Anonymity as an outward-facing cultural practice strengthens the "relational
equality' between the individual participant and the greater cultural movement (Ollman
quoted in Thompson, 2010 p. 56). As mentioned before, Anonymous relies on the
perception of an inexhaustible mass for much of its rhetorical bite. Similar to
stereotypes of hacker culture, which will be explored later, Anonymous relies on the
identical-ness of its masked, technologically anonymized participants to foster a sense
of omnipresence. Outward-facing anonymity prevents outside actors, like the media,
from focusing on and privileging charismatic actors. Anonymous values the optics of
the mass, the "hive," while simultaneously continuing to value internally individuality and
individual initiative (Coleman, 2012).
That said, though anonymity is sought by Anonymous during these actions, it is
not always achieved. Neither the abatishchev nor the NewEraCracker versions of LOIC
tried to cover the user's tracks. More sophisticated DDOS tools will "spoof" IP
addresses, generating a fake IP to assign to the packets the program sends out, or take
other steps to prevent the target of an action from tracing the packets back home.
However, all packets sent with LOIC are tagged with the IP address of the sender. ISPs
maintain records of the IP addresses of computers on their network and can match
those IP records to the real names and addresses of their subscribers. Law
enforcement can and often does subpoena those records when pursuing computer
crime prosecutions. It was possible for an individual using LOIC, without taking
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additional security measures, to be identified on the basis of information contained in
the packets he or she sent.35
For a sophisticated user, this security flaw is relatively easy to detect by glancing
at the tool's source code or by testing the tool against a known machine (such as one's
own server). However, most of those participating in the December 2010 DDOS
campaign were not sophisticated users. They were recent additions to the Anonymous
DDOS army, "nO0bs" or "newfags" in Anonymous parlance. Whereas an experienced
user may have been aware that running LOIC through a proxy or a spoofed IP address
would provide some measure of protection from the security flaws in the tool, it is
unlikely that someone new to digital activism would be aware those tools existed or
would understand how to operate them. Very few of the tutorials available online made
mention of any of these options. In fact, many of the FAQs and tutorials reassured users
that they were unlikely to be caught using the tool as is, or if they were caught, they
were unlikely to face any serious trouble. These statements were often factually
inaccurate and based on a faulty understanding of how servers operated. One FAQ
reads, in part:
0: Will I get caught/arrested for using it?
A: Chances are next to zero [italics added]. Just blame [sic] you
have a virus, or simply deny any knowledge of it.
(Operation Payback Setup Guide, n.d.)
35 The EDT's FloodNet tool, as well as the adapted version used by the electrohippies,
also did not utilize any measures to mask the identity of participants. However, this
should be seen as an extension of those groups' integration of physical world/legal
identity into their actions. Given Anonymous's history of anonymous action and the
emphasis placed on anonymity within Anonymous culture, that LOIC does not conceal
users' identities is more likely to be a mistake or hallmark of an inexperienced developer
rather than an intentional decision.
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The media also picked up this line, and repeated it extensively, as in this article by Joel
Johnson (2010) of Gizmodo:
What is LOIC? It's a pushbutton application that can be
controlled by a central user to launch a flood of killer internet
packets with little risk to the user [italics added]. Because a
DDoS knocks everything offline-at least when it works as
intended-the log files that would normally record each
incoming connection typically just don't work [italics added]. And
even if they do, many LOIC users claim that another user was
on their network or that their machine was part of a bot net-a
DDoS client delivered by virus that performs like a hivemind
LOIC, minus the computer owner actually knowing they are
participating.
(J. Johnson, 2010)
In this article, Johnson mistakenly states that a server targeted by a DDOS action
would not log the IP addresses on the incoming packets, a statement that is simply
inaccurate. In fact, PayPal and other Operation Payback targets kept extensive logs of
traffic to their websites, logs that law enforcement used to target participants for
searches and arrests.
As a result, it is probable that many newly recruited Anons used LOIC to join in
on large-scale DDOS actions against financial institutions, such as PayPal, Visa, and
MasterCard, without taking any security precautions whatsoever. In the coming months,
dozens of those individuals would be arrested and charged under the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (Zetter, 2011). It was later revealed that those arrests were based on a
master list of IP addresses collected by PayPal as its servers were struck by a massive
wave of DDOS actions on December 9th and 10th, 2010 (Poulsen, 2011), something
sites such as Gizmodo had previously claimed was impossible. Despite criticism that
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activist DDOS actions are cheaper or easier or "less risky" than other forms of activism,
these actions can be extremely legally risky, due to an insistence on the part of the
judicial system that activist DDOS actions be treated as criminal, not political, acts.
Identity within distributed actions: Anonymous and the hacker identity
Although early practitioners of mass DDOS actions sought to create an
overarching collective identity for their actions, it usually extended only to vaguely
defined "witnessing" crowd, similar to how Ricardo Dominguez described the
participants in the etoy/toywar DDOS action: "...a global group of people gathered to
bear witness to a wrong" (Dominguez quoted in Wark, 2003). This is in keeping with the
underlying conceit of DDOS as "virtual sit-in." The internet-based nature of the DDOS
releases the participant from the challenges of distance and physical space, but she is
still valued as a far-flung, unaffiliated individual. She does not participate because she
is culturally obligated, but because the networked nature of the DDOS allows her to add
her presence to whatever cause she feels drawn to. A unified, restrictive cultural
identity would have undercut the 'global' mass action aesthetic sought (but not always
achieved) by the organizers, particularly in actions that purposefully crossed national
borders, such as the EDT's Zapatista actions or the Strano Netstrikes36 . As explored
earlier, however, the EDT's reliance on very specific socio-political and linguistic frames
36 The Strano Netstrikes were a series of DDOS actions in December of 1995 targeting
the websites of various French government offices in protest against their nuclear
policies. The actions were organized by an Italian group called the Strano Network, led
by Tommaso Tozzi. (Ludovico, n.d.) (Thomas 2001)
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within their actions, though not an overt cultural identity, served to restrict the global
distribution of their actions.
While the Electronic Disturbance Theater and other groups based their political
philosophies and group cultures within wide frames of anti-capitalist/anti-globalization
activist culture, Anonymous actions are strongly embedded within the restricted,
bounded, cultural frame of A-culture. As previously explored, this allowed participants
to immerse themselves in a pervasive activist setting, and added to the biographical
impact value of participating in the action. This culture also contains a deeply
performative aspect. Drawing on media tropes of hackers and technology, as well as
internet meme culture, Anonymous culture plays with stereotypes to create a public
identity which is anarchic, humorous, and trollish, feeding off the fearful or angry
reactions of the uninformed37
The hacker figure featured prominently in news media and film is a type of
modern folk devil. Based in a deeply seeded apocalyptic techno-paranoia, popular
media more often than not serves to stoke fears that armies of basement-dwelling
adolescents males are eager to dish out vindictive mayhem to a society so tied to
technology that it would be unable to adequately defend itself. The hacker in this story
3 This is generally known as "for the lulz." As explained by Gabriella Coleman:
"Trolling on 4chan often consists of an unpredictable combination of the following:
telephone pranking, having many unpaid pizzas sent to the target's home, DDoSing,
and most especially, splattering personal information, preferably humiliating, all over the
Internet. Since at least 2006, "Anonymous" has conducted many such trolling
campaigns. The motivating force and emotional consequence for the instigators of many
acts of trolling, including those on 4chan, are cited as the "lulz," a pluralization and
bastardization of laugh out loud (101). Lulz denotes the pleasures of trolling, but the lulz
is not exclusive to trolling. The lulz can also refer more generally to lighthearted and
amusing jokes, images, and pranks." (Coleman 2011 a)
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is a dark, unseen force in the network, decentralized and able to cause havoc far from
his physical location. Socially alienated and cut off from normal moral checks, he
engages in pathological, compulsive behaviors with other hackers.. His nights are
spent trying to outdo other hackers in technological feats of mayhem and disruption, and
his skillz are beyond the ken of any 'normal' person (Sauter, 2012).
Anonymous has seized delightedly upon this mythological figure, further reveling
in epithets attached to them by the news media, like "Internet Hate Machine"39 . Their
slogan, "We are Anonymous. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us," evokes
the omnipresent threat of the locationless hacker. Though their methods, DDOS in
particular, may be fairly simplistic in reality, they are advanced enough to confuse the
majority of the public, including law enforcement and the news media, who are happy to
assign the "hacker" moniker to any non-mainstream technological practice deemed
newsworthy. The Anonymous-as-hacker cultural image is a collaboration of sorts
between Anonymous and the media, with Anonymous culture happily playing to type as
the news media repeats and reinforces the stereotype. Anonymous's adoption of the
hacker-figure, a figure generally interpreted as criminal in the media and popular culture,
further reinforces the widely perceived nature of DDOS actions as inherently criminal.
This complicates Anonymous's attempts to use DDOS as a form of political activism.
38 The characterization of such a pathological cycle of behavior is cited by James Aho as
critical to the demonizing of the social enemy, a role the hacker figure occupies in our
modern technology-reliant society. (Aho 1994)
3* This reference originally appeared in a televised investigative report by Phil Shuman,
an investigative reporter for MyFOX Los Angeles, which aired July 26, 2007. The
segment can be viewed here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player embedded&v=DNO6G4ApJQY
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This embrace of the media's anti-social hacker figure is also another
performance of dissent on the part of Anonymous. By embodying the ultimate
boogeyman of the modern technological age, Anonymous rejects the social order as
undesirable and irredeemable. By performing the empowered outcast40 , they also
perform symbolic exit (Shelby, 2012). Anonymous as a culture symbolically exits the
mainstream, commercialized internet, overrun with private interests and attempts at
state governance, and sets itself up as the theatrical embodiment of the internet as it
could to be: anarchic, absurdist, free of outside interference.41
Accessibility within technologically defined tactical spaces
DDOS actions were taken up by digitally enabled activists to be a more
accessible, less geographically bounded tactic for activist expression than physical
world actions. While the Critical Art Ensemble saw the move to the online space as
tracking the movements of structures of power to their new abode (Critical Art
Ensemble, 1996), later groups saw it as a way to lower the barriers to entry. As mass
DDOS actions have continued to develop tactically over the years, different groups have
4 Though the hacker folk devil is a thoroughly othered outcast, he is also seen as being
a techno-wizard, capable and willing of upsetting the entirety of modern society with a
few keystrokes. (Sauter 2012)
41 Gabriella Coleman pointed out in response to an early draft of this section that
Anonymous's use of the hacker image is not universal, and has in several instances
been rejected by various participants in the culture. This brings to the fore the question
of how much of Anonymous's use of the "hacker" identity is reaction to the media's use
of the characterization, and how much is internally developed. It is my view that
Anonymous trollishly exploits the media's overuse of the "hacker" image primarily to
manipulate the culture's perceived "mystique" by outsiders, and secondarily to maintain
an internal, tongue-in-cheek reflection of their own A-culture. But, as with most aspects
of Anonymous, these uses of the "hacker" image are not universally accepted.
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continued to adapt it so that it is easier for individuals to participate. This adaptation
occurs both on the level of tool design and information distribution, but also at a
community level. During Operation Payback, for example, LOIC tutorials began
popping up on YouTube and other locations around the web. Though it would be
impossible to get an exact figure, YouTube search for "LOIC tutorial" yields thousands
of results. One video, "How to Use LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon)", uploaded in mid
November 2010, had been viewed over 80,000 times by December 12, 2010, and had
been viewed over 250,000 by April 2013.42
However, any efforts to further spread the tactic will be hampered by its very
nature as a high bandwidth digital tactic. Its use is restricted to relatively affluent
populations with unrestricted access to digital technology and high quality, predictable
internet connectivity. Most DDOS tools in use from 2010 on must be downloaded and
run from a computer, though other, less widespread versions exists which can be run
from a website or a smart phone. This automatically excludes potential participants in
areas with poor internet connectivity, or those who don't own their own computers and
must rely on machines at schools, libraries, or cyber cafes where they aren't allowed to
download and install new programs.
In some ways, the earlier, webpage based tools like the EDT's FloodNet may
have been more diversely accessible than tools like LOIC or its successors. The early
actions were also strictly scheduled to last for only short amounts of time, at most an
hour or two, to accommodate the restrictions and expense of participating in an action
42 This video and its metrics can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQRu-
J3f Kw and was last accessed on April 23 2013.
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over a dial-up connection. The "occupation"-style DDOS actions organized by
Anonymous, conversely, have run for days through DSL or fiber connections. So
though connectivity and computing power advances have made it possible for actions to
last longer, taking advantage of those advancements can severely limit the potential
participant pool.
This has resulted in natural narrowing of trigger events for activist DDOS actions
to mostly internet or technology oriented events. While the EDT, the electrohippies and
others targeted the online representations of state governments and multi-national
organizations, responding to cross-border issues of policy and globalization,
Anonymous and its kin most frequently respond to events that occur in the online space
itself. Operation Chanology was triggered by the Church of Scientology's attempts to
remove a video of Tom Cruise from various websites. Operation Payback, both in its
initial and Avenge Assange segments, was provoked by actions taken online which
affected "internet native" entities, like the Pirate Bay or Wikileaks. This focus results in a
further narrowing of the potentially interested participant pool. So while DDOS actions
were and are often now deployed with intentions of dramatically expanding the activist
population, accessibility and cultural issues often create severe barriers to that goal.
DDOS and "impure dissent"
Tommie Shelby notes that dissent, when it does not take the form of traditional,
morally exemplary civil disobedience or other anticipated forms of protest, can be
regarded as "impure dissent." Shelby analyzes hip hop and rap as forms of impure
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dissent, but his analysis leaves room for confrontational tactics like DDOS as well.
Shelby defines impure dissent this way:
...while it contains valid political content, it also includes other
elements that sharply diverge from conventional or widely held
normative standards, and these deviant elements may seem to
undermine its political aims. Impure dissent is meaningful
political dissent that is mixed with, for example:....relentless use
of profanity, epithets, and other offensive language; enactment
of negative group stereotypes; violent and pornographic
images; romantic narratives about outlaw figures and street
crime;....xenophobia, homophobia, and misogyny; devaluation
of education and other conventional paths to upward mobility....
(Shelby, 2012, pp. 8-9)
Activist DDOS actions enter into the realm of impure dissent in two areas: DDOS
actions bring activists into direct conflict with the privatized nature of the online space,
with the actions themselves diverging from normative standards of speech and property;
and modern practitioners, particularly Anonymous, whose actions are without questions
the most widely known activist DDOS actions to date, are indelibly linked to anti-social
hacker and criminal personas.
The use of the stereotyped hacker persona by Anonymous has a number of uses
within the culture, including creating greater community cohesion through performance,
aligning the group with a romantic and compelling history, and providing a ready-made
hook for the media to latch on to in their reporting of Anonymous actions. However, by
taking on the outlaw persona, Anonymous also recuses itself from the pantheon of
traditional civic actors. The hacker outlaw is a politically impure actor, a potential threat
who lives on the fringes of respectable society. By taking on that character's mantle,
Anonymous renders their dissent both politically and morally impure. The "inflection" or
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tone of their outward messaging is also seen as deeply problematic, as it often
incorporates cursing, vulgar humor, epithets, and a host of content unsuitable to polite
conversation. Anonymous's status as impure dissenters make it difficult for them to
communicate their political message to those outside the culture, but it does not in and
of itself invalidate their dissent.
As previously mentioned, a primary motivation for the EDT and the electrohippies
during the DDOS actions of the late 1990s was to establish the internet as a viable
space for civil disobedience and dissent. As stated by the electrohippies in one of their
initial papers defending the use of DDOS actions:
Whilst the Internet was originally a place of discussion and
networking, the invasion of corporate interests into this space
has changed the perceptions of what the purpose of the Internet
is. Some believe that the Internet is no longer a 'public' space -
it has become a domain for the large corporations to peddle
their particular brand of unsustainable consumerism. For many
this is unacceptable.... Whatever the views of particular people
about the development of e-commerce on the 'Net, we must not
ignore the fact that as another part of society's public space
the Internet will be used by groups and individuals as a means
of protests. There is no practical difference between cyberspace
and the street in terms of how people use the 'Net.
(DJNZ, 2000)
However, despite their aspirations, the commercialization and privatization of the
internet continued. As of early 2013, the online space is, as it stands, thoroughly
privatized. Public spaces, as they are understood to exist in the physical world under
the guise of parks, sidewalks and roadways, do not exist online. As such, the
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expectations of speech rights online follow, not the norms of public fora, but the norms
of private property.
The Supreme Court has laid out a "public forum doctrine" which guides the
regulation of speech acts in public spaces. It identifies three, sometimes four broad
categories: "the 'traditional public forum,' the 'limited' or 'designated' public forum,' the
'nonpublic forum,' and private property (McPhail, 1998). The most permissive of these is
the traditional public forum, streets, parks, sidewalks, town commons, and other areas
traditionally recognized as being held in common for the public good. Limitations of
speech and protest actions in these spaces, can be subject to only limited "time, place,
and manner restrictions," which cannot be based on the message of the protesters
themselves (Zick, 2009).
The next two categories on the continuum, the limited/designated public forum
and the nonpublic forum which "includes governmental property that is not a public for
'by tradition or designation'-such as a post office or jail," (McPhail, 2009 p. 58), are
subject to the same criteria as the traditional public forum. That is, speech acts at these
locations cannot be restricted based on the content of the speech, and such restrictions
must be "reasonable." However, the Court has noted that the government is under no
Constitutional obligation to proactively protect free speech rights within
limited/designated public fora and nonpublic fora (Zick, 2009). The only property
category that is not limited in its possibly restrictions is private property. The owners of
private property are relatively free in the restrictions they can place on the speech of
others when it takes place on their property. (McPhail, 1998)
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The internet has essentially developed into a entire zone of modern life lacking
some crucial First Amendment protections. While the freedom of the press is relatively
well protected in the online space, the rights of assembly and speech of the average
individual remains unprotected. Given the internet's current role as a basic outlet of
personal expression, association, and communication, this is deeply troubling. While
protest taking place in the various public fora in the physical world have a foundation of
history and legal doctrine to support their legitimacy as valid and protected political
speech, actions that take place in the online sphere can only ever infringe on privately
held property. The architecture of the network does not, as of yet, support spaces held
in common.
As a privately-held public sphere,4 disruptive acts of civil disobedience online will
always be in conflict with dearly held doctrines of private property. Without substantial
legal precedent supporting the rights of the political action to take place, the use of
DDOS as a tactic in and of itself has the potential to render the activist action impure by
coming into conflict with private property rights without the established cultural and legal
protections that have developed around physical world civil disobedience. This is
disastrous for the development of civil disobedience online. By being continually
compared with activism in a sphere with substantially different norms of property and
speech (i.e.: the physical world), civil disobedience online consistently comes out tainted
4 This conflict has a physical world parallel. The initial Occupy Wall Street camp was
established at Zucotti Park, a "privately-held public space" ostensibly available for public
use but still subject to the potential restrictions of private property. The free speech
obligations/protections provided by such spaces are legally murky.
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by perceived criminality or bullying behavior. In this case, it is primarily the evolved
constraints of the network itself that render DDOS activist actions impure.
Conclusions
Activist identity within movements and actions, a complex idea in the physical
world, is further complicated by the highly distributed, mediated nature of online
activism, particularly in the case of activist DDOS actions. In this chapter, I've looked at
how identification and anonymity can each represent specific, intentional political
stances on the role of the state in activism and online. I've further examined
Anonymous's adoption of the exaggerated anti-social "hacker" figure as a cultural
identity, and how this both aids cultural cohesion and complicated their efforts to engage
in popularly legitimated political activism. It's also clear that popular claims that the
internet has opened new doors to political participation and activism are substantially
complicated by the inherently elitist nature of networked technology itself, which in turn
has a direct effect on the types of issues activist DDOS actions are brought to bear on.
Finally, the widespread privatization of the online space, something early practitioners of
activist DDOS actions specifically sought to array themselves against, presents
significant issues to the use of activist DDOS and its practitioners as they attempt to
gain recognition as legitimate political actors. Rather, those who use activist DDOS as
part of their repertoire of protest are likely to be seen as "impure dissenters." Though
they can often reach populations not sympathetic to mainstream political discourse,
"impure dissenters" often cut themselves off from popular legitimation, thus opening
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themselves up to a variety of criticisms and censures that traditional political actors
would not have to face.
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CHAPTER 4
State and Corporate Responses
The reaction of state, corporate and media actors has not been overly
sympathetic to the activist use of DDOS, preferring to interpret uses as criminal or even
acts of "cyberwar." This stunts the potential for not only the evolution of activist DDOS,
but also for civil disobedience online in general. As we saw in Chapter One, early
media coverage of DDOS actions tended to focus on the spectacle of the incident rather
than the reality of the activism. Media reactions were, and have continued to be,
predominantly colored by attempts to associate digital activists and their actions with the
anti-social hacker persona, and acts of criminality or cyberwar. Coverage of the
Electronic Disturbance Theater and the electrohippies typified this pattern of
categorizing activist actions with criminal actions, while Anonymous's self-promoted
association with anti-social hacker stereotypes supported the negative public image of
DDOS as a tactic of civil disobedience. This chapter will look at how the responses of
states and corporate targets of DDOS actions push the criminal perception of activist
DDOS actions on the one hand, and on the other how these reactions fit into the
practice of activist DDOS actions..
State responses: terrorism and sentencing recommendations
In their DDOS action against the WTO in 1999, the electrohippies were, in many
ways, operating within a self-generated frame of digital activism. Though they were
attempting to adapt the accepted frame of civil disobedience from physical world
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activism, the ways in which they were attempting to apply that frame to their disruptive,
direct action campaign against the WTO were novel. This framing, that disruptive,
distributed dissent, which occurred at a distance44 , was necessary for the validation of
distributed activism which occurred primarily in the online space. Recognition of this
frame was necessary for the electrohippies's actions to be viewed as legitimate
activism. Unfortunately, as was noted earlier, this was often not the case, as the
electrohippies themselves note:
As a result of the WTO action the electrohippies collective were
labeled as terrorists...The problem with the knee jerk response
of politicians and e-commerce gurus is that we run the risk of
losing legitimate electronic action as governments use the
excuse of 'hackers' to criminalize certain activities. We must
make sure that both the positive and negative aspects of
internet activism are clearly debated, and that cyberspace is not
excised from the everyday realm of constitutional rights and
freedoms.
(DJNZ, 2000)
This classification mostly took place in the media, as was shown in Chapter 1.
Other analysts paid greater attention to groups' self characterization, as noted by
Dorothy Denning in her testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 2000:
While the above incidents were motivated by political and social
reasons, whether they were sufficiently harmful or frightening to
be classified as cyberterrorism is a judgment call. To the best
of my knowledge, no attack so far has led to violence or injury to
persons, although some may have intimidated their victims.
Both the EDT and the electrohippies view their operations as
acts of civil disobedience, analogous to street protests and
physical sit-ins, not as acts of violence or terrorism. This is an
important distinction. Most activists, whether participating in the
Million Mom's March or a Web sit-in, are not terrorists. My
"4Most of the organizers and activists in the electrohippies were British and operated
from the UK. (electrohippies collective, 2000)
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personal view is that the threat of cyberterrorism has been
mainly theoretical, but it is something to watch and take
reasonable precautions against.
(D. Denning, 2000)
Denning's testimony, combined with the electrohippies' statement, brings to the
fore a number of issues pertinent to the influence and roles of states in digital protests.
While Denning acknowledges the role of self-identification in judging the activist value of
an action, the electrohippies point out that if the online space as a zone is judged to be
unavailable for activist action, then the self-identification matters little. As the Internet
developed from a pseudo-public academic intra-net into a vital part of everyday life for
many people, it was inevitable that those who opposed the privatization of a perceived
commons would be systematically marginalized by both the corporate and state
interests that stood to benefit financially and politically from stabilization of the network.
So although Denning hangs her definition of terrorism on the hook of personal harm and
violence, she also acknowledges that a "judgment call" is required when classifying new
disruptive behaviors. When the relevant "judge" is also the target of the disruptive
protest, it is in their interests to reclassify legitimate protest as ideological violence.
As of this writing, there have been a several cases of activist DDOS actions
which have gone to trial or been pleaded out, in the US and internationally. A significant
case is that of Andreas-Thomas Vogel, a German national who ran the libertad.de
website during the 2001 Deportation Class action against Lufthansa Airlines. Vogel had
posted a call to action on libertad.de and was arrested on charges on coercion. Initially
in 2005, a lower court in Frankfurt found Vogel guilty of using force against Lufthansa,
based predominantly on the economic losses the airline had suffered during the
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campaign, both in terms of lost sales and the costs of acquiring additional bandwidth to
soak the protesters' traffic. Vogel was sentenced to either pay a fine or serve 90 days in
jail. However, the next year, a higher court overturned the verdict, finding, "...the online
demonstration did not constitute a show of force but was intended to influence public
opinion" (Post at thing.net, 2006). Libertad responded to the ruling with a statement that
echoed those we have seen from the electrohippies and the EDT: "Although it is virtual
in nature, the Internet is still a real public space. Wherever dirty deals go down, protests
also have to be possible" (Hans-Peter Kartenberg quoted in thing.net post, 2006).
The Vogel case was the first international precedent to recognize the legal and
philosophical arguments put forth by supporters of DDOS activist actions. The high
court decision pivots on the point that these actions were oriented to influence the
public, and through that avenue, influence the actions of the Lufthansa corporation,
rather than badgering the airline into conceding to a set of demands. Specifically, the
judge ruled that the protest was not an action of force intended to compel an action from
Lufthansa; the action's intention was to impact public opinion first.
There has been no such precedent-setting case thus far in the US courts. This is
in part due to the limited number of arrests resulting from DDOS actions until recently.
Two individuals were arrested in connection with Anonymous's Operation Chanology
DDOS actions against the Church of Scientology in 2007 and 2008. Both cases
resulted in guilty pleas. (Goodin, 2008; Leyden, 2010). The Operation Payback DDOS
actions resulted in fourteen individuals (including one minor) being charged under the
CFAA with participating in the DDOS action against PayPal. Each defendant is being
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charged with two felony counts, which could result in up to 15 years in prison and fines
of up to $500,0000 dollars (Hopkins, 2013). Others have been convicted in connection
with the action internationally (Albanesius 2013). As of April 2013, a verdict had not yet
been reached in the PayPal 14 case.
Potential sentences for DDOS actions in the US are high compared to other
crimes and especially compared to other types of traditionally recognized activist
activities. For example, in the US a sit-in would typically result in a charges of trespass,
if anything. In state of Massachusetts, the punishment for criminal trespass is "a fine of
not more than one hundred dollars or imprisonment for not more than thirty days or both
such fine and imprisonment."45 Resisting arrest, another typical charge, results in a
term of imprisonment of "two and one-half years or a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars, or both."" DDOS actions are prosecuted under Title 18, Section 1030 (a)(5) of
the U.S Code, otherwise known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, DDOS actions,
along with other computer crimes, and are classified as fraud. US sentencing
guidelines, laid out in a yearly United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines
Manual, which are used as recommendations regarding federal cases within the US
legal system, contain a series of adjustments that can be applied to "base offense level"
according to a number of factors. The resultant "offense level" is then used to
* Massachusetts General Laws, Part IV, Title 1, Chapter 266, Section 120: "Entry upon
private property after being forbidden as trespass; prima facie evidence; penalties;
arrests; tenants or occupants excepted. Retrieved from
http://www.malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartV/Titlel/Chapter266/Section120




determine the recommended sentence. Particularly relevant to the case of DDOS
actions are those adjustments that involve the amount of financial losses suffered 47; and
the number of victims48 . PayPal claimed in a British court that the Operation Payback
action cost them E3.5 million in losses, or roughly $5.5 million. That loss figure adds 18
levels to the base offense level for fraud of 7. PayPal did not disclose in court the
number of victims it believes was impacted by Operation Payback, but we can assume it
was probably higher than 250, which is the maximum listed in the US Sentencing
Guidelines, for an additional 6 offense levels, giving us a total offense level of 31. For
an individual with no previous criminal record, the recommended sentence for an
offense level of 31 is 135 months, or more than 11 years. This is without the "special
skills" or "sophisticated means" adjustments, both of which would add several more
offense levels.
There are no established requirements for determining the figures for losses or
number of victims in these cases. PayPal and the prosecution stated during the UK trial
of Christopher Weatherhead that they included the "considerable damage to its
reputation and loss of trade" that resulted from the actions in their calculations49
(Williams, 2013). The lack of oversight in the calculation of damages and the low
maximum number of victims mean that the judicial system is predisposed to come down
hard on the participants and organizers of these actions. Threats of long prison terms
may lead to more individuals pleading out before trial, which could delay a precedent-
47 United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, 2B1.1.b.1
* United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, 2B1.1.b.2 A-C
49 Weatherhead was sentenced to 18 months jail time for his role in the action.
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setting court decision like the Vogel decision in Germany, legitimating disruptive civil
disobedience online.
Corporate responses: the avatar nature of online brand presence
DDOS actions expand potential modes of interaction between individuals or
groups of individuals, and corporations. Corporate websites allow for a symbolic and
actual centralizing of the normally distributed brand reality of a corporate entity. Just as
a corporate headquarters acts as the physical world manifestation of a corporation's
brand identity, and individual products as distributed, appendage-like instances of the
same, a company's website functions as a digital, responsive brand model, but as a
cohesive whole. In physical world activism, the activist is restricted to confrontations
with the physical manifestations of corporate brands, which, especially in the case of
national or multinational entities, are often only a part or appendage of the whole
corporate entity. Instances of activism are limited in their scope and impact: a defaced
billboard is still just one among many; an action at a factory or headquarters does not
distribute itself across multiple brand enactments. But because a corporate brand
website is meant to represent a sprawling corporate entity as a coherent,
comprehensible whole, a confrontation with that digital entity is effectively symbolic of a
confrontation with the corporation as a whole. The bounded nature of the website
allows a new, more symmetric manner of confrontation with individual activists, bounded
individual to bounded individual. The vulnerability of the single instantiation empowers
the activist for the duration of the confrontation, rather than the corporation.
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As holistic representations of corporate entities, websites are high value brand
manifestations. As such, interference or disruption of predictable continuity can provoke
a response that other activist tactics are unlikely to elicit. By imbuing corporate
websites and digital, branded storefronts with the symbolic selfhood of avatars,
corporations have effectively reduced-their public resilience to be equal only to the
resilience of that website.50 Any crack in that digital facade requires immediate
attention, as it has the potential to reflect on the entire corporation, not just one part. In
its pre-internet, distributed incarnation, any number of slights, insults, or disruptions
could have gone unremarked upon. But as a website now can be the manifestation of
an entire corporate entity or brand, continuity disruptions cannot be disregarded. Again,
this necessity-of-response empowers activists by acting as a forcing function with
regard to the responses of corporations. Rather than having to wait and hope that
corporations will respond to an activist action, with the very likely result that the action
will simply be ignored, offenses to the sanctity of the digital brand representation come
too close to disrupting the image of corporate continuity and stability to be ignored. By
virtue of the symbolic value they have invested in the digital brand representation,
corporate entities have obligated themselves to engage with the public disruption, thus
providing activists with a trigger point, provoking a public response.
50 The symbolic investment of corporate selfhood in these online presences should not
be interpreted as either reducing the ability of the corporation exploit other lines of public
communication (through spokespeople, press conferences, etc) or as permission to
reduce the actual and legal vulnerability of such corporate avatars to disruption and
disparagement, either through DDOS actions, parody, satire, or appropriation. Mickey
Mouse may be precious to Disney, but (for now, at least) he can still be used as a tool of
derision against his parent company.
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Like states, these responses are often an attempt to push an interpretation of the
actions as criminal or anti-social rather than activist in nature. As stated above, it is
relatively easy for corporations to claim large damage and victim totals, thus making it
appear that these actions are more disruptive and destructive than they may actually be.
By over-estimating their potential for damage, corporations can promote the perspective
that DDOS actions are incompatible with the continued presence of legitimate business
on the internet.
In this face of this, the question arises: why go for the symbolic disruption of a
corporate homepage when core systems, such as PayPal's payment processing
systems might have been disrupted instead? This response echoes the critiques of the
Critical Art Ensemble referred to in Chapter One, namely that attention-oriented
activism, or activism which aims to influence media and public opinion first, is not as
effective as direct action models. This criticism, however, does not consider that there
may be multiple, equally viable goals to an activist DDOS campaign, and that not all
goals are equally served by simple, covert disruption. If the goal is to publicize, say,
Paypal's participation in Wikileaks Banking Blockade, disrupting their payment
processing system does little to further that goal. This goal is markedly different than
attempting to disrupt the internal operations of an already high-profile event like the
WTO. Within an analysis of a disruptive action, the nuances of what is disrupted and
how are relevant. In some cases, it is more useful to disrupt an image, while in others it
is more useful to disrupt a process.
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Conclusions
Because of its relative novelty, activist DDOS actions are vulnerable to
classifications of criminality and cyberterrorism. Fundamentally, activist actions need to
be recognized as acts of political speech by the state, their participants, law
enforcement, bystanders, and their targets to be effective means of political dissent.
Without that recognition, activist actions can be rendered impotent or counter-
productive. Thus, the responses of states and corporations to the activist DDOS actions
is highly relevant to this analysis. The United State government's pattern of using
cyberwar rhetoric and heavy punishments for so-called "hacking" crimes do not bode
well for its acceptance of activist DDOS actions as a legitimate form of civil
disobedience or disruptive protest. While corporations may perhaps wish that activist
DDOS actions could be ignored, the symbolic importance often invested in the stability
of a corporation's online presence, which is read as a reflection of the stability of the
corporation as a whole, makes this impossible. In this way, corporations have obligated
themselves to respond quickly to activist DDOS actions, ironically making them an
attractive mode of activism for individuals and groups who see disruption as an effective
model of political action.
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CHAPTER 5
Ethical DDOS Actions: An Analytical Framework
Though DDOS actions have been used as a tool of digital activism for the past
two decades, the past few years have seen an explosion in the popularization of the
tactic and a sharp increase in the attention its use attracts from the media and state
actors. This attention has brought with it loud criticism from various stakeholders in the
digital space, including other digital activists. However, both the tactic's critics and
defenders seek to declare the tactic as a whole good or bad, without a nuanced
understanding of the variety of circumstances and contexts that can render the tactic's
use ethical or unethical. In this chapter, I aim to lay down the preliminaries for a
framework by which to perform an ethical analysis of activist DDOS actions in individual
use contexts.
The purpose of this ethical framework is to provide a basis for the analysis of
DDOS actions that have already occurred. The framework considers the use of the
tactic within broader campaigns; activists' motivations for using the tactic; the intended
and actual effects achieved; the technological capacities used; power relations between
organizers, participants and targets; and the role of state, state-related, and semi-state
actors. Taken together, these factors create a holistic, qualitative system for evaluating
the ethical validity of a given DDOS action, and can be used to create models to guide
the use of the tactic, and similarly disruptive tools of digital activism in the future.
112
The value of disruption and the right to be heard
The disruptive nature of activist DDOS action does not, in and of itself, invalidate
it as a tactic of activism. Particularly in so much as the technologically bounded nature
of the tactic enables it to confront the changing nature of the online environment, the
disruptive use of DDOS constitutes a form of Pfaffenberger's "technological
reconstitution," wherein
... impact constituencies actively reshape technological
production processes or artifacts guided by a self-consciously
'revolutionary' ideology, producing what I call counterartifiacts.
This ideology is produced by means of a symbolic inversion
called antisignification.
(B. Pfaffenberger, 1992)
The "counterartifact" produced here is the disruption itself. By replacing continuity with
disruption, activists attempt to create a rhetorical cavity in the digitized structure of
capitalism wherein activism can take place. This break in "business as usual" makes
room for counter-actions of activism. It is the creation of excavated, disrupted space
that is valuable in these contexts, sometimes even more valuable than the specific
instances of activist/target engagement. In this way, environments are created for the
revelation of "hidden transcripts" of resistance (Scott, 1990). This is particularly
apparent in the case of the Anonymous Operation Payback, wherein the vast majority of
the actions and organization took place online among individuals who had not met in the
physical world. As a tactic whose strength is in the digitized power of a crowd, the
DDOS serves as an open action wherein individual participants "recognize the full
extent to which their claims, their dreams, their anger is shared by other subordinates
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with whom they have not been in direct touch" (Scott, 1990). While hidden transcripts
are valuable independently, they are most effective when performed by a group or
crowd, a concerted action that allows the participants to recognize that they are a
connected, though not necessarily in constant contact. The disruption, i.e. the creation
of the counterartifact allows for the establishment of this meeting space, which is in its
turn a type of antisignification.
This is to say that the disruption inherent in DDOS actions is not empty of
meaning. The targeted content is not supplanted by a void. Rather, it is exchanged for
the fact of action. A conversation occurs, though the parties are speaking with different
vocabularies.
It is often the case with unpopular, dissenting, or poorly funded causes that
disruption is one of the only avenues to public attention. As covered in Chapter One,
the news media is the modern arbiter of popular attention, deciding which activist
causes are worth space on the front page or time on the 11 o'clock news. If the actions
taken by activists don't "look like" activism, or the views presented are too outside the
mainstream to appeal to viewers-and advertisers-it is likely that these actions will not
be covered at all (Barron, 1967). However it is vital to a democracy that unpopular and
dissenting ideas be aired, discussed, and debated in the open. As Justice William 0.
Douglas wrote in his 1951 dissent to Dennis v. United States:
Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the
testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free
discussion keeps a society from becoming stagnant and
unprepared for the stresses and strains that work to tear all
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civilizations apart. Full and free discussion has indeed been the
first article of our faith.
(W. Douglas, 1951)
An unbroken broadcasting of the status quo impoverishes our democracy. In order to
avoid such a situation, dissenting views much not only be spoken but also heard. Owen
Fiss (1996), Jerome Barron (1967), and others have presented interpretations of the
First Amendment which encompasses a "right to be heard" and a "right to hear" as well
as a "right to speak." Though it may be argued that the internet has substantially
increased the number of soap boxes available, it has not increased the availability of the
audience. Rather, as individuals become more adept at filtering their information taps,
and as the infrastructure of the internet and the physical world around them makes it
easier to avoid unwanted encounters with unpopular or simply different viewpoints, the
ability of dissenters to truly have a voice in the national debate is being steadily
diminished (Zick, 2009).
For unpopular and dissenting causes to attract the attention of a news media
industry that, for economic reasons, is often uninterested in covering them, disruption of
some kind is often necessary. Attention is attracted via the fact of the disruption, and
the dissenting view is covered. As discussed in Chapter One, this is often a
complicated process as activists attempt to engage the attention of the mainstream
through the use innovative and disruptive tactics, always running a risk that their
activism will not be recognized as such or dismissed as a novelty. However, in an
information landscape where corporate, homogenized news media still dominates much
of the agenda setting, resorting to extreme tactics in the hopes of heard is often a better
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option for the dissenter than simply waiting to be heard by grace and chance. In this
way, disruption of some kind is a necessary part of the modern repertoire of contention.
Online, that disruption may take the form of a DDOS action, while in the physical world it
may look like a sit-in or occupation. What is critical is that the status quo, the normal
flow of information must be disrupted is dissenting voices are to be both voiced and
heard.
Disruption is not the most appropriate tactic in all activist cases. It is important to
consider in a given action whether disruption moves a dialogue forward by challenging
architectures, structures, and entities previously imagined to be solid and unalterable, or
if it is an attempt to silence un-replaceable speech. Similarly, it is useful to consider that
not all disrupted speech is silenced, as corporations and states often have a number of
outlets for speech, especially through intermediaries like the news media. However,
disruptive actions that are not accompanied by effective public messaging run the risk of
being misinterpreted by targets, the media, and the public, or not being noticed at all.
Intended effects and actual effects
As mentioned above, DDOS actions have historically been characterized as
being little more than crowdsourced censorship, a sort of digitized heckler's veto. This
characterization, certainly appropriate in some cases, such as those instances of state-
initiated DDOS actions against independent media sites analyzed by Ethan Zuckerman
and others (2010), is easily and inappropriately generalized to the use of the tactic as a
whole. This often occurs because identical technological ends states (such as a site
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being slowed or going down entirely) can be arrived at by different actors with
dramatically different motivations, which are not necessarily immediately evident. This
motivation myopia is exacerbated by the absence in US law of any useful analysis of
motive in the determination of the criminality of a DDOS action. A DDOS action
launched to extort money from a site operator is considered legally equivalent to an
activist action against a large corporate site for the purpose of drawing attention to an
issue. However, when attempting an ethical classification of these acts, it is vital to take
into account both the intended effects of an action, and the actual effects of the action.
To illustrate this point, I will examine three different actions that particularly highlight this
analytical factor: the 1997 IGC/Euskal Herria action, the 2001 Deportation Class action
against Lufthansa Airlines, and the eToys/etoy 1999 toywar campaign.
IGC/Euskal Herria Journal action
Oxblood Ruffin's accusation that DDOS actions are nothing more than "illegal,
unethical, and uncivil" (Ruffin, 2000) censorship is correct when the goal of a DDOS
action is to permanently render inaccessible speech on the internet that has no other
outlet. One such example is the popular DDOS action launched in Spain against the
internet service provider IGC in 1997. The stated goal of the action, initiated and led by
persons at this point unknown to this author, was to force IGC to stop hosting the
Basque publication Euskal Herria Journal (Nicol, n.d.). This was a populist minded
action; at one point, the major Spanish newspaper El Pais threw its support behind the
mailbombing campaign and published target email addressed for the IGC, though it later
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retracted its support and removed the emails from its website (Gor, 1997). The
campaign included network level actions and an email campaign, eventually rendering
inaccessible the websites and email of IGC's over 13,000 subscribers. In the interest of
continuing to provide service to its other subscribers, many of which were also minority
political publications, IGC was forced to stop providing hosting to Euskal Herria Journal,
though it did so under protest (IGC, 1997).
As an ISP, IGC exists primarily, if not entirely, online. Removing IGC's ability to
be present online removes its raison d'dtre and its ability to function as a corporation. A
DDOS action on IGC strikes a violent blow to the core of the organization directly.
Furthermore, the stress placed on the IGC network crippled the entire IGC apparatus.
System outages affected more than just the Euskal Herria Journafs site, and the email-
bombing campaign hampered the communications of all who used the IGC's
mailservers. The levels of collateral damage at the level of basic communications were
high.
The goal of the action against IGC was to force the removal of the Euskal Herria
Journal website from its servers and by doing so deny Euskal Herria Journal access to
its only outlet for speech. This was an objection to content being available on the
internet. For as long as it was successfully running, the DDOS action rendered that
content unavailable. So, in actual effect, the action caused the intended effect. The goal
of the DDOS action, and the surrounding campaign was the permanent imposition of its
immediate effects.
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The Deportation Class Action
Not all disruptions of content are equivalent to the silencing of speech, however.
This is particularly true when the intent of an action is to change something not wholly
present on the internet, such as the behavior of a large, multi-national corporation. In
2001, two German activist organizations, Kein Mensch ist illegal (No man is illegal) and
Libertad! launched the "Deportation Class" action against Lufthansa Airlines. This was
a coordinated, multi-pronged protest against the German government's use of the
airlines' flights to deport immigrants. Using an adaptation of the Electronic Disturbance
Theater's FloodNet tool, some 13,000 people participated in a DDOS action against the
airline's homepage, which did experience some downtime over the course of the action
(Dominguez, 2009). Shortly after the action, which included press releases and physical
world actions at stockholder meetings, Lufthansa stopped allowing the German
government to use its flights to deport immigrants.
The Deportation Class action targeted the website of a major airline. While the
site itself was rendered briefly inaccessible, the actual corporation, its ability to fly
planes, maintain normal operations, and communicate internally and with the media
remained, for practical purposes, unaffected. Unlike the IGC action, which effectively
prevented the basic functions of business for the organization, this action neither sought
nor achieved a fatal disruption in either the airline's normal operations or modes of
communicating internally or externally. This type action, which only affects the
homepage of an organization that does not primarily exist online, has been described as
'[tearing] down a poster hung up by the CIA," (Munroe, 2011) with the implication that
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the action is technologically simplistic and has little practical impact on the organization
targeted. It is a symbolic action rather than a direct action, performed for the benefit of
those participating and those watching.
The stated goal of the Lufthansa action was to draw public attention to a specific
aspect of the airline's business model, and through the focused attention change the
corporation's behavior. Though the DDOS action took place on the internet, the effect it
sought was not limited, was not even present in the online space. In and of itself, this
DDOS action could not have achieved what the EDT set out to accomplish. It took
positive behavior on the part of Lufthansa for the "Deportation class" action to achieve
its goals, as opposed to the IGC action, which was designed to accomplish its intended
effect by gross fiat.
The etoy toywar
In December of 1999, the EDT, the Swiss art group etoy, and RTmark launched
"The Twelve Days of Christmas" action using the EDT's FloodNet DDOS tool. Their
target was the retail site eToys.com, which had filed a lawsuit against the etoy group
over the ownership of the URL etoy.com (Wark, 2003). As part of the greater toywar
campaign, which involved physical world demonstrations, publicity and letter writing
campaigns, and a multiplayer online game, the "12 Days of Christmas" campaign was
intended, according to Ricardo Dominguez, to "...represent the present of a global group
of people gathered to bear witness to a wrong" (Dominguez quoted in Wark, 2003).
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While the action may have been intended to symbolically represent the
displeasure at the bullying tactics of a large e-commerce corporation, it also had a
significant impact on eToys Inc business. Though the e-retailer's site never crashed, it
was significantly slowed during the course of the action, rendering it unusable through
most of the peak holiday shopping season. Over the course of the campaign, the share
price of eToys Inc dropped from $67 to $15, for a net loss of $4.5 billion, which etoy
reported as the "most expensive performance in art history" with evident glee (Grether,
2000). It is also worth noting that this was a battle between two innovative, internet-
centered organizations. etoy, the art group, existed primarily through their electronic
projects, experiments, and performances, while eToys Inc was a successful e-
commerce retailer, its operational business consisting of little more than an online
storefront (etoys.com) and a massive warehouse. As both executed denial-of-service-
actions against each other (eToys Inc via a judicial injunction forcing Network Solutions
to remove the etoy.com URL from the internet and etoy via its FloodNet powered DDOS
campaign), both aimed their actions at their opponents' core. The toywar campaign,
however, enjoyed the support of some 1,700 participants, whose participatory weight
added credence to its ethical claims (McKenzie, 2001). This judgment is bolstered by




As mentioned previously, it is becoming increasingly difficult for a purely
volunteer, manual style DDOS action (which require a body in a chair for the duration of
the action and can claim the strongest line of symmetry to physical world sit-ins) to have
a noticeable effect on a large, robust corporate website. This is due to advances in
technology as well as the vending of DDOS defense services to at-risk companies by
companies like Akamai and Arbor Networks. This had led to the use of botnets, traffic
multipliers, automated tools, and other exploits to bring the power of such actions in line
with the defenses employed by targets. While the use of such technological tools
doesn't automatically negatively affect the validity of an activist DDOS action, the use of
non-volunteer botnets is a particularly worrying turn. Volunteer botnets present their own
ethical concerns, but are less immediately objectionable.
Another aspect to consider is how advances in infrastructure and connectivity
have changed the nature of DDOS actions over time. Groups like Strano, the EDT, and
others active in the 1990s and early 2000s structured their actions to be of basically
short duration. The Strano Netstrike action, taking place on December 21, 1995, lasted
for an hour (Thomas, 2001). The EDT's "Tactical Theater Schedule," a list of the
FloodNet actions taking place in 1998, notes that actions run from "10:00 a.m. to 12:00
p.m. and 4:00 to 6:00 p.m... Mexico City Time" for each of the thirteen dates listed.51
The technical and financial realities of dial-up internet prevented, for the most part, more
ambitious actions of longer duration. the electrohippies 1999 WTO action was unique in
51 This schedule is currently archived at http://www.thing.net/-rdom/ecd/ecd98.html and
was last accessed April 23, 2013.
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that it was designed to take place continually over a number of days. The transition
from telephone-based internet connections to cable and fiber connections has altered
the duration calculus for DDOS actions. With the high speed, always on internet
connections available to many participants, DDOS actions have the potential to go on
for days, or weeks, or indefinitely. While organizers were once constrained simply by
technical capacity, other concerns, including ethics, must now come into play when
determining the duration of DDOS actions.
Volunteer and non-volunteer botnets
In the winter of 2010, the controversial online group Anonymous launched
Operation Payback, targeting various organizations that had arrayed themselves in
opposition to Wikileaks in the wake of the latter's release of a large cache of diplomatic
cables exfiltrated from the US State Department. The DDOS action was predominantly
powered by the Low Orbit Ion Cannon DDOS tool, which contained functionalities for
both "Manual" mode, which required the user to target and fire the tool independently,
and "Hive Mind" mode, which allowed the user to join a volunteer botnet, controlled via a
central IRC channel. In her 2012 book, Parmy Olson stated that in addition to Low Orbit
Ion Cannon, non- volunteer (i.e. criminal) botnets were employed in the Operation
52 The November 29, 1999 call-to-action email states, "The sit-in will begin 08.00 USA &
Canada (Pacific time) 30th November... and will finish four days later." The email notes
that those with dial up connections may not be able to stay online for the whole planned
four days, and so advises, "If you cannot afford to spend much time online then
concentrate on November 30th (or Dec. 1 rst for those in the East. But we would like
people to aim to go online for 12.00 Pacific time on December 3rd (add 4 hours to the
above timetable for your local time) until the end of December 4th."
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Payback DDOS raids that resulted in the most downtime per target. Non-volunteer
botnets are created by infecting computers with a program which allows them to be
controlled by a remote server without the owners' knowledge. The use of someone's
technological resources without their consent in a political action, particularly one that
carries high legal risk, is a grossly unethical action. Moreover it cheapens the
participation of the activists who are consensually participating, and makes it easier for
critics to dismiss DDOS actions as criminality cloaked as free speech.
Prior to Anonymous's Hive Mind powered volunteer botnets, the tactic had been
used by pro-Israeli activists in 1999. A group of Israeli students calling themselves Help
Israel Win released a tool that allowed people to participate in DDOS actions, ostensibly
targeting anti-Israel websites. Like LOIC's Hive Mind mode, individuals who downloaded
the Patriot DDOS software package from help-israel-win.tk could link their computers to
an IRC server and participate in DDOS actions. Unlike LOIC, Patriot runs solely in the
background and does not allow for user input of any kind (Carr, 2011). The original
website is no longer online or archived, however Jeffrey Carr quotes the group's self-
characterization as "a group of students who are tired of sitting around doing nothing
while the citizens of Sderot and the cities around the Gaza Strip are suffering." Their
goal of "unit[ing] the computer capabilities of many people around the world.. .in order to
disrupt our enemies efforts to destroy the state of Israel" (as quoted in Carr, 2011)
echoes similar articulations by the electrohippies around their WTO action.
124
The release of the tool itself garnered a moderate amount of media attention,
attracting coverage in Wired e and blogs." The Wired article notes that at one point
there were roughly 1,000 computers hooked into the botnet, and Help Israel Win
claimed credit for bringing down sarayaalquds.org and qudsvoice.net.
Volunteer botnets also raise issues of consent, ones that are incumbent on the
organizers to address. Volunteer botnets make it easy for different people to participate
in DDOS actions without encountering the hardships that sitting in front of a computer
and searching for targeting and scheduling information might present to working
individuals, students, or people in different time zones than the primary organizers.
Rather, they can pledge their support and resources to a given cause and trust the
organizers to utilize those resources wisely. This then places a responsibility on the
organizers to maintain strong, open communications channels with those participants
and not make significant changes to the operation of the DDOS campaign without their
consent. It is also necessary that organizers publicize information on how one might
withdraw from a voluntary botnet if individuals should wish to do so.
Context within a greater campaign
The EDT and other groups have repeatedly termed activist DDOS actions
"digital" or "virtual sit-ins" (Auty, 2004). This nomenclature is highly evocative, and
5 Shachtman, Noah (2009, January 8) Wage Cyberwar Against Hamas, Surrender Your
PC. Wired. Retrieved from http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/01 /israel-dns-hack/
5 Zuckerman, Ethan. (2009, January 18) Install a trojan for Israel? Uh, no thanks. My




allows activists to build off the pedagogical and cultural capital of historical physical
world sit-ins (Rolfe, 2005). However, the metaphor is imperfect, and glosses over many
challenges inherent to the digital form, particularly that of proximity to messaging. In a
physical world sit-in, the rhetorical proximity of the protest to the target is central to the
disruption. Though this has sometimes been challenged in the US with the
establishment of "protest zones" near locations deemed to be sensitive, the physical
closeness of protest actions to direct or symbolic targets is a valuable part of activist
messaging, as was discussed in Chapter One.
This type of proximal messaging is not natural in the online space. DDOS actions
in particular may by invisible to the public. Rather, a user attempting to access a
targeted site may have no exposure to the protest's messaging at all and may not even
register that an action is taking place. All that is apparent to them is that the site they
are looking for is operating poorly or not at all. Not only does this represent a failed
opportunity for the campaign, but it also shifts blame/credit to the target. For this reason,
it is incumbent on the organizers of such actions to maintain a high profile messaging
campaign in addition to any activist DDOS actions that are taking place, as well as
exploring other avenues of digital message distribution that may be spontaneously
discovered by the public, such as Google-bombing, typo-squatting, or defacements.
Power relations between organizers, participants, and targets
An analysis of extant power dynamics between the organizers, participants, and
targets of activist DDOS actions can help address concerns of bullying or censorship
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that can arise regarding the use of the tactic. As the internet lowers barriers to
individual connections across a variety of physical world borders and barriers, it also
enables activism to occurs at scales of distance previously unheard of, as well as
fostering interactions between individuals and entities which may have been previously
impossible, such as allowing individuals to enter into direct confrontation with the
realized entity of a corporation or state.
Several activist DDOS actions have occurred over international borders, where
activists from one country targeted the government websites of another country. An
early example of this is the 1995 Strano Netstrike, which was organized by activists in
Italy, but targeted the web presence of the French government in order to protest
policies of the French government. Similarly, the EDT's Zapatista actions were
organized in the US, but targeted the websites of the Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo,
as well as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, among others, in order to protest the Mexican
governments treatment of the Zapatistas. Additionally, participants may be drawn from
a grab-bag of countries and jurisdictions. This practice of "transnational activism"
(Tarrow 2005) has transformed traditional understandings of state/activist relations.
In these cases, there are several different dynamics to be picked apart. The
initial, assumed power struggle between activists and state entities is complicated when
those activists are not citizens of the targeted states. The interaction raises questions
as to a given state's responsibility for the concerns of foreign civilians and to the global
activist public. There is the added power relationship between the state(s) from which
the organizers and the bulk of the DDOS action originates and the targeted state. This
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is a particularly important consideration when allegations of cyberwar are or could be at
play. Given the current uncertainty regarding the rules of engagement in interstate
conflicts, organizers engaging in transnational activist actions should take care that they
do not inadvertently set off an international incident.
Beyond transnational activism, DDOS actions expand potential modes of
interaction between individuals or groups of individuals, and corporations. An important
consideration actions targeting corporate entities is the potential for unintended, adverse
effects on the public. As more companies move primary aspects of their public-facing
business online, it is important to consider the importance of constant uptime to users
for reasons beyond convenience. For example, a temporary disruption in the online
presence of a retail service or professional association could be substantially different in
scope and effect from a disruption in medical or financial services. Disruption is a highly
valuable tool of activism, drawing attention via the spectacle of novelty to issues
activists want to highlight. However, in planning actions that aim to disrupt essential
services in the medical, financial, or utility spheres, organizers should take into account
the potential for unintended damage caused by disruptions in these services.
Conclusions
If activist DDOS actions are to continue to be a tool in the repertoire of digital
activism, there needs to be a structured method for determining the ethical validity of
those actions. This is necessary both for the benefit of organizers considering the use of
the tactic, as well as for the legal and political arguments that arise as activists push for
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the tactic's widespread acceptance and legitimacy. Here I have tried to lay out that
framework, using examples from the history of activist DDOS actions as illustrations.
That said, this is still a reflective framework, and works best as an analytical tool to be




The Future of DDOS
Over the course of this work, I've attempted to arrive at a thorough description of
the history and current practice of activist distributed denial of service actions, as well as
presenting the framework for a reflective ethical analysis of actions. The question now
is, will the practice of activist DDOS actions continue, or are practical, theoretical, and
ethical challenges faced too great to allow for the tactic to be effective?
As I described earlier, downtime is notoriously hard to achieve for an all-volunteer
activist DDOS action, especially against a large corporate target. An "arms race"
dynamic has ensued, which encourages the use of non-volunteer botnets and exploits
to augment volunteer efforts and which also diminishes the ethical validity of activist
DDOS actions. The defensive capabilities of for-hire firms like Prolexic and Arbor
Networks, responding mainly to the advancements in criminal DDOS actions, continue
to outstrip the capabilities of nearly all activist campaigns.
As downtime continues to become more and more difficult to ethically achieve,
media exhaustion also becomes a concern. As of 2013, criminal DDOS actions
received more coverage than activist DDOS actions, and coverage often does not make
clear the distinctions between the two types of actions. Could activist DDOS actions
simply become invisible in the sea of criminal actions? Or could the media landscape go
the other way, with DDOS actions of all stripes becoming so commonplace that they
warrant no coverage at all? Either outcome would be devastating for the publicity and
messaging goals of activist DDOS actions.
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The use of DDOS as a tactic of extortion, criminality, and nation-state-initiated
censorship is damaging to its perceived legitimacy as an activist tactic. This association
hampers the perception of activist DDOS actions as legitimate and worthwhile acts of
political activism, and also prevents the further diffusion of the tactic. The flamboyant,
anti-social pantomime performed by Anonymous and other similar groups further
restricts open use of the tactic to an online fringe.
Because of its enduring associations with criminality and extreme online
subcultures, in addition to its current legal status and particular technical challenges, I
think it is unlikely at this time that DDOS actions will ever become a part of the popularly
accepted activist repertoire of contention in the near future, unlike similar physical world
tactics like sit-ins or occupations. However, I predict that DDOS actions will remain
popular among internet-based fringe groups and subcultures, particularly those which
adhere to a Barlowian view of the independent, self-contained nature of the Internet. As
high-profile hacker and computer crime cases come to trial, particularly the upcoming
trials of the Paypal 14, these will serve as radicalizing events, "group grievances," for
the transgressive, technologically-mediated subcultures which are currently serving as
cultural laboratories for disruptive online activism.
This radicalization, which occurs most strongly in the aftermath of convictions
(such as those of Andrew Aurenheimer, also known as weev; or Jeremy Hammond) or
tragedies (such as the suicide of Aaron Swartz), further underlines the perceived
disjuncture between behavioral norms in these subcultures (or, in some cases, in more
mainstream, technologically sophisticated populations) and the legal response delivered
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by the state. The popular association of activist DDOS actions with criminality is often
not of interest to these radicalized groups, and may even be a point of attraction. The
disapproval of the state can serve to underscore its cluelessness with regard to the
internet and technologically-mediated transgressive subcultures, a cluelessness which
these subcultures in turn often see as something to mock and exaggerate.
Is the use of DDOS by these groups abridging their ability to develop other
innovating forms of online activism? The answer to this is an unequivocal no. Though
not examined in this work, the resurgence of tactics like doxing, "human flesh search,"
information exfiltration, leaking, defacement, software development, the remote
organization of backup internet connectivity in the event of nation-level shutdowns, and
large scale data analysis, either automated or human-distributed, are all indicators of
innovative developments in tactical and strategic activism. However, many of these are
advanced activities, requiring significant skill, organization, support, and planning to pull
off. They are not entry-level activities. As such, the pool of potential participants is
much smaller, and would not necessarily benefit from a massive influx of inexperienced
but nonetheless eager participants. Moreover, many of the tactics listed above and
others are not attention-oriented in the same way that many activist DDOS actions are:
massive amounts of media attention are not their goal, and may be detrimental. The
attention-oriented nature of activist DDOS actions lends itself to encouraging media
coverage at a level that other tactics might not.
As a "street-less" space, that the internet runs counter to many assumed
practices of speech and public politics appears to belie Nathan Jurgenson's "digital
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dualism" fallacy (Jurgenson, 2011). The "speechy" nature of the online space had led to
this seeming contradiction, wherein existing speech online is so highly valued that we
drastically de-value other types of disruptive, activist speech which are tolerated, even
specifically valued, in the offline world. If we acknowledge that civil disobedience and
disruptive activism are valuable tools of activist speech and political discourse in the
physical world, than it must also be acknowledged that they should be equally valuable
and desirable in the online space. In the online space, dissenting speech should have a
platform and a voice, ones that we are occasionally obligated to encounter, just as we
encounter them in the physical world. As an avenue for speech, the internet should also
be open to dissenting, potentially disruptive speech. Without forced encounters with
dissent, our society will stagnant.
Activist DDOS actions started as an exploration into the activist potential of the
internet by activists experienced in "on the streets" activism. In its modern incarnation,
activist DDOS is practiced mainly by fringe actors, who consider the online space a
primary zone of interaction, socialization, and political action. Though in many ways an
extremely accessible stepping stone to more involved methods of online activism,
DDOS actions remain privileged in many ways, including their basic technological
nature, the specific populations involved, and the specific legal and cultural challenges
inherent in modern non-mainstream computer use. Though DDOS itself may become
increasingly marginalized as an activist practice, high profile campaigns like Operation
Payback and its ensuing legal battle have opened the debate on the validity, desirability
and potential of disruptive activism and civil disobedience in the online space. This
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work is presented as a step towards the robust analysis of these repertoires of
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